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The Lawyer’s Independence — Part II

The Lawyer’s Independence: A Universal Principle of Disparate Meanings

Part II – A Critical Analysis of International Legal Ethics

This post follows up on my discussion of the ethical principle of a lawyer’s independence. Though virtually all national and international codes of conduct codify the lawyer’s independence, a lawyer’s understanding of this principle and the ethical duties deriving therefrom differs depending on his or her legal tradition.

In my first post, I attempted to clarify what it means to be “independent” in the national context by discussing the lawyer’s role in the civil and common law systems and how the principle of independence is interpreted in various domestic legal systems. This post will focus on the ethical principle of a lawyer’s independence in the context of international and internationalized criminal tribunals based on the various applicable and aspirational codes of conduct.

Lawyers (hereinafter “Counsel” as generally referred to at international tribunals and courts) from different legal traditions have different experiences and are beholden to their own canons and traditions of professional ethics. What may be permissible in one national jurisdiction may not be permissible in another, and depending on the circumstance, may or may not be permissible at one of the ad hoc international or internationalized criminal tribunals, or the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). And herein lies the conundrum: with which code of conduct and with which interpretation of any of the ethical principles must Counsel abide when practicing at any of the international or internationalized tribunals? Is it as simple as saying that Counsel must abide by the code of conduct of the tribunal or court before which he or she is appearing? What if there is a conflict or a notable difference between Counsel’s national code and the court’s code? This fundamental ethical issue, which Counsel will invariably encounter in representing accused or victims before these courts and tribunals, will be the topic of another post. I merely raise this point now to highlight just how not so simple or straightforward it really is in practice to straddle codes of conduct with diverging meanings of ethical principles that textually and with an unadorned reading seem identical. Continue reading “The Lawyer’s Independence — Part II”

Judgement by essay at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia results in public apology

On 2 December 2015, the Public Affairs Section (PAS) of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) published its November Court Report. The PAS saw fit to include in the Court Report an essay titled “Exploring Transgenerational Justice at the ECCC”, which was published without attribution. In the essay, which discussed PAS interviews of high school students and senior citizens about their perspectives on trauma and justice, the author reached some astonishing conclusions about crimes purportedly committed from 1975 to 1979 (the period in which the Khmer Rouge governed Cambodia). In the author’s view, “some of the most gruesome crimes against humanity were perpetrated [in the years between 1975 and 1979]” and, “[d]espite having only second-hand information about the genocide perpetrated in their nation, [students] envision a peaceful Cambodia similar to the pre-1975 Cambodian society.”((ECCC Court Report, November 2015, Issue 91, p. 2 (emphasis added).)) Continue reading “Judgement by essay at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia results in public apology”

The Lawyer’s Independence: A Universal Principle of Disparate Meanings – Part I

Part I – A Critical Analysis of Domestic Legal Ethics

Lawyers, in protecting the rights of their clients and in promoting the cause of justice, shall seek to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by national and international law and shall at all times act freely and diligently in accordance with the law and recognized standards and ethics of the legal profession.((Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Art. 14, Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crimes and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.))

The lawyer’s independence is a principle universally recognized as one of the cornerstones of the legal profession the world over. As can be seen from the above quote, lawyers must be independent and, at all times, act freely if they are to carry out their professional functions, which include, inter alia, advocating for the advancement of human rights, protecting the rights of their clients, and fostering the administration of justice. Virtually all national and international codes of professional conduct codify the lawyer’s independence. However, a lawyer’s understanding of the principle of “independence” and the ethical duties deriving therefrom, differs depending on his or her legal tradition. Continue reading “The Lawyer’s Independence: A Universal Principle of Disparate Meanings – Part I”

Attorney-Client Privilege – Part VI: So Just How Immunized Am I Before the International Tribunals?

This is the final post on my discussion of the attorney-client privilege and the crime-fraud exception raised in Prosecutor v. Bemba et al. (“Bemba”) before the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). In my first post, I set out the factual context of the case. In the second and third posts, I discussed the attorney-client privilege in national tribunals and international tribunals. In the fourth post, I gave an overview of the crime-fraud exception and a legal analysis of the issues arising from the Pre-Trial Chamber((Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-52-Red2, Decision on the Prosecutor’s “Request for Judicial Order to Obtain Evidence for Investigation under Article 70”, 29 July 2013.)) and Trial Chamber((Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo et al., ICC-01/05-01/13-1096, Decision on Defence Request for Leave to Appeal the “Decision Providing Materials in Two Independent Counsel Reports and Related Matters”, 21 July 2015.)) decisions relating to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s (“OTP”) request for a judicial order to obtain evidence. In my fifth post, I discussed the application of other types of evidentiary privileges at the international criminal tribunals. In this final post I will discuss the privileges and immunities accorded to those working at the international criminal tribunals, focusing primarily on the immunities afforded to Counsel. Continue reading “Attorney-Client Privilege – Part VI: So Just How Immunized Am I Before the International Tribunals?”

Attorney-Client Privilege – Part III: International Tribunals

The third post in this blog series discussing questions of attorney-client privilege raised in Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo et al. (“Bemba”) will explore the contours of the attorney-client privilege used in international criminal tribunals. As discussed in my previous post, the attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege for confidential communications firmly established in domestic legal systems. Its rationale is founded upon fundamental fair trial rights, primarily the freedom from self-incrimination and the right to communicate freely with Counsel. This privilege – which is not absolute – does not cover all communications between the lawyer and client. Continue reading “Attorney-Client Privilege – Part III: International Tribunals”

Hybrid Courts: a marriage of inconvenience

Last December I had the privilege of being invited to participate at a conference hosted by the International Research and Documentation Centre War Crimes Trials, in Marburg, Germany. The conference, titled The Defence in International Criminal Courts, was by far the best conference I have ever attended, focusing on defence issues from Nuremberg and onwards. The presentations and discussions were excellent. Here is an excerpt of my presentation. The full version is scheduled for publication.

Hybrid Courts: a marriage of inconvenience
Michael G. Karnavas

Imagine being on the football pitch. The stakes are high – it’s a championship game. You and your teammates have been preparing for this game, sharpening your skills, studying your opponent, developing your game plan, mastering the intricacies of the rules, doing everything possible to take advantage of every opportunity that may present itself and every weakness that your opponent may have. All is riding on this game, so you have thought of everything. You are ready. You are ready to control the ball, control your opponent, control the slightest openings. Ready to control it all. All except the referee. That’s the wildcard. The unknown, the unpredictable, the uncontrollable. The luck of the draw. If the referee knows the rules and applies the rules as they are intended, then you have only yourself to blame if the game is lost. But what if the referee does not follow the rules or applies them unevenly, or interprets them in a manner that is not in keeping with the spirit and tradition of the game? What if the referee decides to also play with the ball, handle it a bit, kick it around, pass it to your opponents, or, worse yet, lay in wait near your goalpost for the opportune moment to tap the ball into your net (even if it takes using his hands) and, having done so, smugly signals the goal? Continue reading “Hybrid Courts: a marriage of inconvenience”

THE USE OF TORTURE-TAINTED EVIDENCE AT THE ECCC

THE USE OF TORTURE-TAINTED EVIDENCE AT THE ECCC: What is the applicable standard for assessing whether a statement is established as being made under torture and what are the parameters, if any, for the admissibility of torture tainted evidence?

The issue of the admissibility and permissible uses of evidence obtained through torture has arisen repeatedly at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in Cases 001 and 002, due to the fact that there is a large body of material before the ECCC Court emanating from the notorious security center S-21 (also known as Tuol Sleng) and other alleged security centers around Cambodia.

Recently the issue has come up again, after the Trial Chamber prohibited the Nuon Chea Defence in Case 002/02 from questioning a witness on the contents of a confession. The Nuon Chea Defence asserted that the Trial Chamber was using a double standard, allowing the Prosecution to ask questions concerning confessions, but not the Defence. The Prosecution requested to file written submissions and to have oral arguments on the issue. The Trial Chamber agreed and the parties’ submissions were received 21 May 2015. Oral arguments occurred 25 May 2015. Continue reading “THE USE OF TORTURE-TAINTED EVIDENCE AT THE ECCC”

POPOVIĆ APPEAL CHAMBER REFUSES TO REVIEW JCE III APPLICABILITY

In my last post, I addressed the applicability of JCE III, arguing that as a product of judicial creation, JCE III does not exist in customary international law and should not be applied. This post is a follow up in light of the 30 January 2015 ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgement in the Srebrenica case, Prosecutor v. Popović et al., affirming the convictions for genocide.((Prosecutor v. Popović et al., IT-05-88-A, Judgement, 30 January 2015, paras. 1670-1674.))

One of the Popović Accused, Miletić, had argued that the Trial Chamber erred in law in holding that JCE III existed in customary international law at the time of the events.((Prosecutor v. Popović et al., IT-05-88-A, Judgement, 30 January 2015, para. 1670.)) He emphasized that the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’s (“ECCC”) rejection of JCE III shows that it is not generally accepted and that its application is contrary to the nullum crimen sine lege principle.

Unfortunately, the Popović Appeals Judgement missed an exquisite opportunity to rectify the long-perpetuated error of law first made by the Tadić Appeals Chamber, which found that JCE existed in customary international law. Rather than engage in a constructive analysis, the Popović Appeals Chamber merely referred to its previous jurisprudence and found that Miletić failed to demonstrate any cogent reason to depart from it.((Prosecutor v. Popović et al., IT-05-88-A, Judgement, 30 January 2015, para. 1674.)) This has been the problem from the outset. No ICTY Chamber has been willing to thoroughly analyze the state of customary international law; instead they choose to refer back to prior Judgements as if these Judgements themselves are evidence of JCE’s customary status. Continue reading “POPOVIĆ APPEAL CHAMBER REFUSES TO REVIEW JCE III APPLICABILITY”

The fiction of JCE III in customary international law

After countless challenges and criticism from a wide-range of legal traditions regarding the extended form of joint criminal enterprise (“JCE III”), the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) held that JCE III does not exist in customary international law.((Case of NUON Chea et al., 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), Decision on the Appeals of the Co-Investigative Judges[’] on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), 20 May 2010, para. 78.)) The ECCC Trial Chamber, in its Decision on the Applicability of JCE, examined additional case law relied upon for JCE III support, and upheld and affirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusion.((Case of NUON Chea et al., 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-TC, Decision on the Applicability of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 12 September 2011, paras. 33-35.)) Continue reading “The fiction of JCE III in customary international law”

Karnavas critiques DeFalco article on “most responsible” at the ECCC

The ECCC has jurisdiction over “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible” for certain crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction.¹ Randle DeFalco’s article Cases 003 and 004 at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Definition of “Most Responsible” Individuals According to International Criminal Law, concludes that the suspects in Cases 003 and 004 fall within the meaning of “most responsible” and that the only legally sound option is to bring the cases to trial.

According to Michael G. Karnavas:

DeFalco’s analysis is result-determinative and based on the premise that if the suspects are not found “most responsible” there will be no other trials and the suspects would escape criminal responsibility. Although DeFalco’s basic approach to determine the meaning of “most responsible” is sensible, through his analysis he commits several errors that lead him to his pre-determined conclusion. DeFalco’s conclusions are unsurprising when considering his association with Documentation Center of Cambodia (“DC-Cam”) and interest in verifying its pre-determined conclusion that genocide and crimes against humanity occurred in Cambodia.

Click here to read Karnavas’ full critique of DeFalco’s arguments, which has been submitted to DC-CAM for publication.

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 6 June 2003, Preamble. [↩]