International Criminal Law Archives - michaelgkarnavas.net/Blog

THE ICC’S GLASS HOUSE: A Cassandra Warning in L’Affaire Khan

Justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done.

— Lord Hewart

When the world’s criminal court faces allegations against its own leaders, the issue is no longer just personal. It becomes a test of whether the institution upholds the accountability it expects from others.

Courts are built on trust. Brick by brick, decision by decision, they build reputations that may take decades to earn and only moments to destroy. When the world’s permanent international criminal court—the institution responsible for prosecuting the most serious crimes known to humanity—finds itself facing allegations against its own chief prosecutor, the issue is no longer just personal. It becomes institutional.

And institutions, unlike individuals, cannot afford the luxury of ambiguity.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) now faces a critical moment. What started as allegations involving its Prosecutor, has quietly grown into something bigger: a test of whether the ICC truly believes in the principles it was established to uphold. Continue reading “THE ICC’S GLASS HOUSE: A Cassandra Warning in L’Affaire Khan”

DEBUNKING ILLUSIONS: What ICC Delay Tells Us About Power, Politics, and Prosecutorial Choice — Part II of INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS

This is Part II of my series: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: A Realist’s View on the ICC’s Limitations.

Read Part I here.

Part II

Instead of lamenting that the United States might prosecute Nicolás Maduro before the International Criminal Court (ICC) ever does, a more honest—and more uncomfortable—question should be asked: why did an institution created to confront mass atrocities fail to act with urgency when it mattered most?

Much of the commentary on Maduro’s potential prosecution relies on the idea that international justice follows a single moral timeline, with the ICC as its natural pinnacle. From this view, some see national proceedings as nothing more than distractions at best, or hurdles at worst. This perspective is not only legally flawed; it is also institutionally evasive. It shifts focus away from the ICC’s own history of delays, selectivity, and strategic hesitation, and instead blames others for inaction. Continue reading “DEBUNKING ILLUSIONS: What ICC Delay Tells Us About Power, Politics, and Prosecutorial Choice — Part II of INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS”

JUSTICE DELAYED, JUSTICE MYTHOLOGIZED: Maduro, the ICC, and the Perils of Justice Without Power — Part I of INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS

INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: A Realist’s View on the ICC’s Limitations

International criminal justice navigates a delicate balance between aspiration and authority. It invokes the language of universality but functions within a realm shaped by power, sovereignty, and uneven enforcement. This tension is most evident in discussions about the ICC, national prosecutions, and claims that domestic actions “undermine” or “obstruct” international justice.

Starting with the arrest of Nicolás Maduro and the possibility of an ICC sealed arrest warrant, I examine a straightforward yet frequently challenged concept: international criminal law is intertwined with geopolitics rather than existing above it. The ICC was never designed to control power, supersede sovereign jurisdictions, or hold complete accountability. Its authority depends on conditions, its enforcement varies, and its impact is influenced as much by political factors as by legal rules.

Rather than mourning these limitations, I advocate for honest confrontation. This approach does not undermine international justice; it enhances it. The real question is not whether the ICC is important, but what it can practically accomplish, when, and at what expense. Only by discarding comforting illusions can international criminal law establish itself as a credible and lasting endeavor.

This two-part series deliberately transitions from doctrine to delay, then to power, offering a realist perspective on what international criminal justice can—and cannot—accomplish in a world governed by sovereignty and strategic interests. My main argument is that international justice doesn’t fail because national jurisdictions act; it fails when symbolic aspiration is mistaken for real enforcement capabilities. Uneven accountability reflects uneven power, but this does not undermine international law; instead, it grounds it in reality. Naturally, these issues are complex and merit detailed, nuanced analysis, which this brief series cannot provide. Hopefully, however, it encourages discussion on what international criminal law, international criminal tribunals, especially the ICC, can realistically achieve. Continue reading “JUSTICE DELAYED, JUSTICE MYTHOLOGIZED: Maduro, the ICC, and the Perils of Justice Without Power — Part I of INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS”

Part II — THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UNENFORCEABLE: Points 2–21/26 & the Fantasy of Amnesty in the Putin-Trump “Peace Plan”

The International Criminal Court Statute is explicit on certain challenges to accountability such as superior orders, head of state immunity, and statute of limitations, but is silent both as to any duty to prosecute and with regard to amnesties. Although the issue was raised during the Rome Conference at which the Statute was adopted, no clear consensus developed among the delegates as to how the question should be resolved. This too suggests that customary international law had not crystallized on this point, at least not in 1998. —

Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 1022 (2006)

My initial reaction to Trump’s 28-point “peace plan,” created (or adopted, see Part I) by his inexperienced negotiation team, was not outrage or surprise but disbelief. I was genuinely astonished that four lawyers could produce (or claim ownership of) a document so legally incoherent, so fatally flawed, so flabbergasting, that it fails the laughing test. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are not just real estate magnates; they are lawyers in one of the most contract-heavy industries globally. Surely they understand the basics of their contractual arrangements: words matter, ambiguity is dangerous, contradictions are disastrous, and legal terms must be enforceable. When they step outside their expertise, they know to get advice from someone who isn’t. This isn’t advanced public international law; it’s basic ethics and professional responsibility. Continue reading “Part II — THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UNENFORCEABLE: Points 2–21/26 & the Fantasy of Amnesty in the Putin-Trump “Peace Plan” “

The Putin–Trump 28-Point “Peace Plan”: Part 1 – Appeasement by Another Name

In the days of our sorrow when others, more powerful, have decided to beggar our ancient country… It is not we who should be ashamed.

— Josef Hora

When the 28-point Putin–Trump “peace plan” surfaced, most of the world reacted with disbelief. Ukraine was given six days to accept it — an ultimatum masquerading as diplomacy. As reporting accumulated, a clearer picture emerged: the document appears to have been drafted by Putin’s envoy, translated into English, and delivered to Trump’s negotiating team, which adopted and repackaged it as its own. From there, it was presented to President Zelensky as the official U.S. framework for ending the war.

If Michael D. Weiss’s account in his Bulwark interview proves accurate, the 28 points were hammered out by Kirill Alexandrovich Dmitriev — one of Putin’s close associates—together with two real-estate developers, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The draft, written first in Russian and then translated, was passed back to the Kremlin and returned to Witkoff, who has reportedly been advising the Russians on how Putin should “handle” Trump, to be presented to the Ukrainians as a U.S. peace proposal. Continue reading “The Putin–Trump 28-Point “Peace Plan”: Part 1 – Appeasement by Another Name”

KHAN PART 2 — WHAT TO MAKE OF THE QATAR-LINKED “SPY-GATE” THAT TARGETED THE COMPLAINANT? Has the Time Come for ICC Prosecutor Khan to Resign or Be Eased Out?

The truth of the matter is that you always know the right thing to do. The hard part is doing it.

Robert H. Schuler

The International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor, Karim A. A. Khan KC, should take the honorable step of resigning – posthaste.

There is no way to soften the truth or the distastefulness of the situation. What the public now sees resembles the unraveling of a spy novel—competing narratives of misinformation and disinformation, suggestions of double agents, questionable witnesses, whispered talk of a honeytrap, and more. Some of this may be accurate; much of it likely not. But that is beside the point. The collateral damage already inflicted upon the ICC is unmistakable. A court that aspires to serve as the court of last resort now risks appearing as a parody of its own ideals.

The allegations against Khan, however they ultimately resolve, have already compromised his stature. Accusations of sexual assault or rape almost inevitably inflict enduring reputational injury, even if exoneration follows. Yet this is only part of the problem. The latest revelations concerning efforts to target or discredit the complainant – even without any evidence that Khan was directly or indirectly involved, whether personally or through intermediaries – cast an even deeper shadow over the institution, particularly over the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). Taken together, the Khan affair and the reported behind-the-scenes maneuvers aimed at pressuring or undermining the complainant constitute not merely an unfortunate distraction but a profound blow to the integrity, professionalism, and credibility expected of the Court’s chief prosecutor. Continue reading “KHAN PART 2 — WHAT TO MAKE OF THE QATAR-LINKED “SPY-GATE” THAT TARGETED THE COMPLAINANT? Has the Time Come for ICC Prosecutor Khan to Resign or Be Eased Out?”

KHAN PART 1 — WHEN OPACITY FRAMES PERCEPTIONS: Is the Karim Khan affair investigation being slow-walked to deep-six the results?

“… many accounts of bullying behaviour amounting to harassment in all Organs of the Court though particularly the OTP … complaints that the culture of the Court’s workplace was adversarial and implicitly discriminatory against women. … a number of accounts of sexual harassment, notably uninvited and unwanted sexual advances from more senior male staff to their female subordinates.”(para. 209.)

Independent Expert Review

Throughout its history, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has struggled with workplace harassment – not as an occasional lapse, but as a recurring, deeply rooted institutional problem. The issue is neither marginal nor conjectural. As the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) commissioned Independent Expert Review (discussed here), concluded in its 30 September 2020 Final Report, harassment – sexual and otherwise – was pervasive across the ICC and, within the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), virtually systemic. That the OTP emerged as the “gold medalist” in this ignominious category surprised few insiders at the time.

Yes, reforms have been undertaken, and yes, some progress has been made. But when a culture of harassment becomes embedded – tolerated, normalized, and allowed to proliferate – optimism must be tempered by realism. Eradicating a deep-rooted institutional malaise requires far more than rewritten policies or aspirational memos. It demands vigilance, transparency, and a willingness to confront misconduct at every level, including the highest.

This brings us to the present and the allegations against Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC (discussed here). To be clear, these are allegations; nothing has been proven. However, they include conduct that, in some national jurisdictions, could be classified as sexual assault or even rape. The possible permutations are limited: the encounter was consensual; it started consensually but became non-consensual; or it never happened and was fabricated. There are also claims of attempts to improperly influence the complainant and witnesses – conduct that, if true, could have Article 70 implications. Continue reading “KHAN PART 1 — WHEN OPACITY FRAMES PERCEPTIONS: Is the Karim Khan affair investigation being slow-walked to deep-six the results?”

Defence Counsel Training at the ICC: A disorganized, under-resourced, afterthought

On 8 July 2025, I received a group email from “ICC Seminars” with an invitation to “Counsel admitted to the Court’s List of Counsel and the Court’s List of Assistants to participate in the upcoming hybrid Training for Counsel. This training will be held both online and at the Court from Tuesday, 23 September to Thursday, 25 September 2025.” There is no limitation for on-line attendance. The email stated a draft agenda would be shared in due course, while the invitation attachment said a draft agenda was attached. It was not. The email also advised that a link would be available in “early September.” As far as I know, neither has occurred.

Although the invitation states the “training is organised in collaboration with the ICC Bar Association and with funding from the European Union,” I see nothing about the training on the ICCBA website training or home pages.

With the training about 2 weeks away, I thought I’d share the below email I sent back that same day.

Dear CSS,

With all due respect, it’s genuinely difficult to understand how counsel are expected to commit their time, money, and professional energy to a training program when no information is provided—none—about the actual content. Is it really too much to expect that, before announcing an annual training (especially one that fills on a first-come, first-served basis), there would at least be a confirmed agenda and committed trainers?

After more than two decades of operation, one would reasonably expect CSS to have mastered the basics of planning and communication. This isn’t merely a matter of logistics or scheduling; it’s about respecting the time, financial constraints, and professional obligations of the very individuals the system depends on. Surely, we can all agree that counsel don’t attend these trainings for the hotel breakfast—they come to learn, to improve, to engage. That requires substance. And unfortunately, substance has too often been in short supply.

Over the years, I’ve tried—gently and not so gently—to convey two realities: first, that a large portion of counsel on the list still lack essential trial and appellate skills; and second, that the CSS annual training, more often than not, offers style over substance. Yet every year, I find myself watching the same last-minute scramble, the same absence of serious preparation, and the same missed opportunity for meaningful capacity-building. It’s become almost ritualistic.

Now, I understand there may be a lack of in-house expertise—after all, to my knowledge, no one within CSS has direct international trial or appellate experience. Fair enough. But that’s hardly a fatal obstacle. The field is rich with experienced counsel who are willing—eager, even—to contribute. So the continued reluctance to engage that expertise, to tap into the available resources, remains baffling. A mystery, really.

Until that changes, I’ll continue to express my concern—not out of habit or complaint, but because I care about the integrity of the profession and the quality of representation provided in international proceedings. And, as always, I remain entirely willing to assist in raising the standard—should anyone at CSS wish to take up the offer.

Respectfully but disappoint[ed]ly ,

Michael G. Karnavas

No response was forthcoming.

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When Critique Becomes Caricature: A Response to James Radcliffe

Having already clarified my original post — Sanctions as Stimulative Measures: A Sovereign Prerogative Untethered from Moral Discernment — and followed it with Deserve’s Got Nothing to Do with It: A Response to Critiques of My Views on U.S. Sanctions and the ICC, I had not intended to revisit the matter. These were rare indulgences, prompted by private messages from colleagues whose intellect I respect. But Mr. James Radcliffe, apparently of the University of New South Wales, has now contributed a comment so drenched in bile and devoid of reasoned argument that, regrettably, another response is necessary. Continue reading “When Critique Becomes Caricature: A Response to James Radcliffe”

THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part II: Sovereignty, Paralysis, the Future of International Law & the Confluence of Unpredictable Events

But suppose the safety of the State is endangered; our foresight can not extend too far. Are we to delay averting our destruction until it has become inevitable?… If an unknown man takes aim at me in the middle of a forest I am not yet certain that he wishes to kill me; must I allow him time to fire in order to be sure of his intent? Is there any reasonable casuist who would deny me the right to forestall the act?… Must we await he danger? Must we let the storm gather strength when it might be scattered at its rising?

Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758), 248-249

Resuming and Recontextualizing

The legal and strategic implications of Israel’s aerial offensive inside Iran – unprecedented in both scope and timing – are difficult to overstate. This was not retaliation. There was no missile barrage, no chemical warhead in the sky, no mass-casualty provocation. Ramadan had just ended. The region was diplomatically active, not ablaze. American, French, and Saudi officials were brokering normalization talks between Israel and Riyadh. The West wanted calm.

Netanyahu chose escalation.

Or did he?

The Pre-Emptive Strike in Self Defense Look closer, and the logic begins to snap into place – albeit under intense scrutiny and through a narrow legal aperture. There was no armed attack that might clearly trigger the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Israel acted not in response to violence, but to intelligence. This was anticipatory self-defense: a controversial exception to the general prohibition on the use of force. The legal test for self-defence– drawn from the 19th-century Caroline doctrine and later jurisprudence – demands that the necessity of self-defense be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Continue reading “THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part II: Sovereignty, Paralysis, the Future of International Law & the Confluence of Unpredictable Events”