Karnavas publishes paper on reparations to Khmer Rouge victims through sustainable health care

Remedying Victims Of Khmer Rouge Crimes With Sustainable Healthcare Through Reparations Or Transitional Justice Principles

By Michael G. Karnavas

Michael G. Karnavas was commissioned by the Documentation Center of Cambodia (“DC-Cam”), funded by USAID, to examine and propose healthcare as a means of reparation’s to victims of the Khmer Rouge. His paper was published 11 May 2022.

Victims of large-scale human rights violations have a fundamental right to reparations grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Unfortunately, rarely, if ever, are mechanisms adopted and implemented that would meaningfully redress the victims. The Cambodian victims of the violations of human rights committed during the Democratic Kampuchea (“DK”) period of 1975 to 1979 – many of whom were admitted as Civil Parties participating in proceedings at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) – are no different.

Although virtually the entire population was severely traumatized during the DK period, formal mental healthcare services for the survivors, as well as others, have been either lacking or woefully inadequate to meet demand. The ECCC – which was established by an Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia to “brin[g] to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations” in Cambodia between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979 – can only award non-compensatory and symbolic reparations.

Given this gap, DC-Cam has been advocating that Cambodia and the international community can and should do more to repair victims of the Khmer Rouge atrocities. As part of DC-Cam’s ongoing initiative to implement a program that sustainably supports the health and welfare of survivors, this paper explores: (a) to what extent providing healthcare services for DK period victims fits within the reparations frameworks of the international(ized) criminal courts and tribunals, including the ECCC; and (b) whether absent such possibilities, healthcare services should be provided as part of a transitional justice package designed to help Cambodian society sustainably deal with the legacy of the DK period.

Concluding that the reparations frameworks of international(ized) criminal courts and tribunals and the ECCC show that providing healthcare services as a reparations measure is effectively unrealizable, this paper provides recommendations on implementing a sustainable healthcare initiative in Cambodia as a transitional justice measure and presents further areas for exploration.

Interested in hearing Michael’s pull-no-punches observations about the ECCC and its legacy? Pour yourself a glass and settle back to listen to this wide-ranging interview he gave DC-Cam.

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The Kosovo Specialist Chambers’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence: More of the Same Hybridity with Added Prosecutorial Transparency

The Kosovo Specialist Chambers’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence: More of the Same Hybridity with Added Prosecutorial Transparency, an article by Michael G. Karnavas, has been published in the International Criminal Law Review.

The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers incorporates procedural rules from Kosovo’s domestic legal system, innovative and useful modalities, procedural rules, practice directives, and lessons learned from the other international(ised) criminal tribunals. Based on a presentation given by Michael G. Karnavas on 22 June 2018 at Leiden University’s Grotius Centre Supranational Criminal Law Lecture Series — The Kosovo Specialist Chambers: Comparative Legal Perspectives — this article provides a defence perspective on some of the modalities found in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. In the author’s opinion, some of the provisions on disclosure provide greater protections of fair trial rights for suspects and accused during the confirmation and pre-trial stages than the rules of other international(ised) criminal tribunals, while also maintaining the schizophrenic features found in these international(ised) jurisdictions — placing the burden of proof on the prosecution while granting the trial judges discretionary authority to engage in truth-seeking activities.

For an earlier discussion of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, see Michael’s seven-part series:

LOOKING FOR BAO NINH

On 14 August 2018, The Mekong Review published an essay I wrote about my search in the mid 90’s for Vietnamese writer Bao Ninh, author of The Sorrow of War. That essay, Looking for Bao Ninh, is reproduced below.

LOOKING FOR BAO NINH

MICHAEL KARNAVAS – AUG 14, 2018

I took my first trip to Southeast Asia in 1994. I went to Phnom Penh to volunteer, teaching trial advocacy skills for the Cambodian Defender Project. Showing up unannounced, I was told to come back a month later. So I headed north to Hanoi. Vietnam had opened its doors to foreign investment and tourism. It was an exuberant time, full of optimism. Continue reading “LOOKING FOR BAO NINH”

Judges called to task for failure to defend the defence

On 2 August 2016, a prosecution expert lashed out at the Defence while being cross-examined at the ECCC. The judges of the trial chamber sat silent. In an opinion piece published 8 August 2016 in The Cambodia Daily, Michael G. Karnavas takes the judges to task for their complicit passivity.

Apathy Signals Open Season on Defense Lawyers in Case 002

BY MICHAEL KARNAVAS AUGUST 8, 2016

On August 2, 2016, Henri Locard, testifying as an “expert” in Case 002, lashed out at Khieu Samphan’s lawyer, Anta Guisse, claiming to have been put under “cold torture” the previous day when examined—“Historian Accuses Tribunal Lawyers Of ‘Cold Torture,’” (August 3).

The reference to cold torture, for those who have not followed the trial, is about one of the methods employed by Kaing Guek Eav, better known as Duch, at S-21, or Tuol Sleng, in extracting confessions. Mr. Locard then went on to say that if Ms. Guisse continued to apply cold torture, after three days maybe he would gift his persona to Angkar, implying that the questioning was a form of re-education to conform his thinking to that of the Democratic Kampuchea regime. Continue reading “Judges called to task for failure to defend the defence”

The ADC-ICTY Publishes its Legacy Conference Proceedings

In 2002 Defence Counsel at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) formed the Association of Defence Counsel Practicing Before the ICTY (ADC-ICTY) to assist in promoting the fairness of the proceedings and to protect the interests of Defence Counsel. Eleven years later and after countless accomplishments, the ADC-ICTY held its Legacy Conference on 29 November 2013. And now the ADC-ICTY has published the Legacy Conference Proceedings, making it available online. Privileged to moderate the panel on the Rights of the Accused, I followed up with a short article, The Rights of the Accused, intending to capture the essence of the fair trial rights Defence Counsel endeavor to ensure for all suspects and accused appearing before international criminal tribunals.

Karnavas critiques DeFalco article on “most responsible” at the ECCC

The ECCC has jurisdiction over “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible” for certain crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction.¹ Randle DeFalco’s article Cases 003 and 004 at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Definition of “Most Responsible” Individuals According to International Criminal Law, concludes that the suspects in Cases 003 and 004 fall within the meaning of “most responsible” and that the only legally sound option is to bring the cases to trial.

According to Michael G. Karnavas:

DeFalco’s analysis is result-determinative and based on the premise that if the suspects are not found “most responsible” there will be no other trials and the suspects would escape criminal responsibility. Although DeFalco’s basic approach to determine the meaning of “most responsible” is sensible, through his analysis he commits several errors that lead him to his pre-determined conclusion. DeFalco’s conclusions are unsurprising when considering his association with Documentation Center of Cambodia (“DC-Cam”) and interest in verifying its pre-determined conclusion that genocide and crimes against humanity occurred in Cambodia.

Click here to read Karnavas’ full critique of DeFalco’s arguments, which has been submitted to DC-CAM for publication.

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 6 June 2003, Preamble. [↩]

ADC-ICTY LECTURE ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

“‘Conflict of interests’ is a term that is often used and seldom defined.” ¹

Michael Karnavas delivers ADC-ICTY Confilcts Lecture

On 16 April 2014 I was invited by the Association of Defence Counsel practicing before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ADC-ICTY) to conduct training for its members and others on ethics. The topic chosen was Conflicts of Interest. The lecture lasted 2 hours. A modest PowerPoint presentation was used to guide the lecture which was based on handout material made available after the lecture. Certificates were also issued to the participants for those who wished to claim 2 hours of CLE on ethics with their national / state bar.

The lecture focused on the lawyer’s core responsibilities to the client in both national and international jurisdictions: competence, diligence, communication, confidentiality, loyalty, honesty, and independence. Principles that are universal.

Continue reading “ADC-ICTY LECTURE ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST”

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 (1980) (United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, dissenting). [↩]

Brown University Seminar – Part V

This five-part blog post is drawn from Michael G. Karnavas’s Seminar at the Brown University International Organization (BRIO) February 27, 2014. The complete piece is available on Michael’s website.

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VI. CLOSING THOUGHTS

In wrapping up the seminar, I discussed the implications of the various positions that are out there. To strike or not to strike. Operate outside the international legal framework, or operate as if within the international legal framework (as suggested by the UK) or alternatively with the view of recalibrating (redefining) the law on the use of force?

Military strikes against Syria without UN Security Council approval are almost certainly a violation of international law. Building a coalition of the willing that operates outside the UN would not make it any more legal, though, as in Kosovo, it could be viewed as legitimate or morally right. Punishment is not a legal justification. International law does not seem to provide a right of states to respond with force to serious violations of international law—even when that law prohibits the use of chemical weapons. Continue reading “Brown University Seminar – Part V”

Brown University Seminar — Part IV

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3. Discussion on Syria—is there a legal basis or justification outside the Security Council?

The United States’ positions discussed seem to provide a justification for the use of force based on punitive reprisals and anticipatory self-defense. However, President Obama gave mixed messages. The US seems to be scoping out all the possible justifications for the use of force. An analysis of the legal rules governing countermeasures and reprisals, armed force in reaction to a breach of an international law norm is generally prohibited.[1] Similarly, the use of force in anticipatory self-defense is not regarded as lawful. It goes beyond the Caroline precedent as an armed attack from Syria on the US or UK is not imminent. A strict application of the UN Charter to determine the legality of the use of force under Articles 2(4), 39 and 42 leaves us with the proposition that any intervention outside the Security Council, apart from self-defense, would be unlawful. In regard to the UK position, R2P leaves us at square one—as it requires Security Council authorization. R2P does not solve any of the issues when there is Security Council deadlock. Continue reading “Brown University Seminar — Part IV”

Brown University Seminar — Part III

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IV. DISCUSSION

After going through all the various legal provisions, I touched on the evolution of the legal theory in practice. The law is not static, and this is not the first time we have seen this type of scenario. The situation in Kosovo in the 1990s involved intervention by a coalition of the willing outside the legal framework. A somewhat progressive legal doctrine “Responsibility to Protect”—“R2P” for short—was adopted shortly after NATO’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia, in order to develop some of the legal framework in regard to the use of force. However, today, we can see that R2P falls short of legalizing intervention outside of the UN framework. Perhaps this is the price paid for acting without UN Security authorization, when examining the evolution of R2P. Continue reading “Brown University Seminar — Part III”