[E]thos counts more than any other aspect of rhetoric because it puts your audience in the ideal state of persuadability. Cicero said you want them to be attentive, trusting, and willing to be persuaded. They’re more likely to be interested if they find you worth their attention. The trusting part goes with the ethical territory of cuse, craft, and caring. As for their willingness to be persuaded, you want them to consider you a role model-the essence of leadership. And where does this attitude come from? The same perceived traits: cause, craft, caring.
Jay Henrichs, Thank You for Arguing, p. 79
In my previous post, I explored ethos as the core of persuasive advocacy—credibility demonstrated through action. I emphasized that ethos is not your résumé. It is not seniority. It is not even reputation in the abstract. It is trust built in real time: sentence by sentence, answer by answer, concession by concession. It is the quiet but decisive assessment judges form about whether you are reliable.
And here is the uncomfortable truth: most advocates do not lose their ethos through dramatic misconduct. They lose it quietly. Gradually. Often without realizing it.
Few advocates start their day intending to deceive the judges. Most are intelligent, conscientious, and genuinely dedicated to their clients and the pursuit of justice. However, credibility is rarely destroyed by major ethical violations. Instead, it is often damaged by small habits, subconscious impulses, and misguided strategic instincts—patterns that seem harmless on their own but become harmful over time. For example: adding an adjective for emphasis, framing a fact too strongly, citing an authority without full context, resisting a concession longer than necessary, or answering a question defensively instead of directly.
None of these, when considered alone, seems dreadful. But judges do not evaluate advocates in isolated moments. They assess patterns. They listen for proportionality. They observe tone. They note whether an advocate appears genuinely committed to helping them or just trying to win a debate, to score a point, or to pull a fast one over them. Continue reading “HOW ADVOCATES LOSE ETHOS: A Gradual Erosion (Part II of the Effective Advocacy Trilogy)”
Since persuasive oral advocacy depends on storytelling and the capacity to communicate with ease and clarity, I often start my advice to moot court participants and young lawyers with a familiar exercise: imagining a conversation with a stranger over drinks at a bar. This simple scenario tests an advocate’s understanding of the facts, the law, the issues, and the procedural context. More importantly, it challenges them to explain those elements clearly, succinctly, and persuasively to someone unfamiliar with the case, showing why each point matters. If your arguments can be understood—and appreciated—by a stranger, you are well on the path to guiding a bench.In this way, the exercise is both a mirror and a bridge: it reflects your mastery of the written brief developed in Part I while helping you turn that work into compelling oral advocacy. 
It was a delightful evening at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies at Leiden University Law School. The students came armed with serious questions. To my relief, none asked the usual how could I defend those people? or what if you know (or believe) your client is guilty? With the exception of one or two occasionally checking their smart phones, they seemed focused and interested. While I like to think my presentation had something to do with this, I believe the real reason is because these bright, motivated and prepared students were keen to hear about the practical applications of the theoretical substance of international criminal procedure.
Article 7(2) of the ICC Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel (Code) presumes that list counsel possess a high level of knowledge of the applicable law and a high level of skills required for the adopted party-driven, adversarial hybrid procedure, and thus must “participate in training initiatives required to maintain such competence.” This presumption is fanciful. Not all list counsel are sufficiently competent – let alone to a high level – simply because they have managed to get themselves on the list. Counsel cannot “maintain a high level of competence” unless they are already competent to a high level. Query whose responsibility is it to ensure that at least those counsel appearing in proceedings before the ICC have a high level of competence. In no small measure I suggest it is the ICC Registrar, through the Counsel Support Section (CSS), which is responsible for setting the standards for the admission of counsel.