Logos in Action: Building Persuasive Legal Reasoning

Persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proven a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive argument suitable to the case in question.


—Aristotle

Introduction

In an earlier post (here), I distinguished between dialectic and rhetoric: the former as a method for testing propositions in pursuit of truth, the latter as a craft aimed at persuading others of what is most likely true. Dialectic, in the Socratic tradition, interrogates assumptions; rhetoric operates under conditions of uncertainty, where conclusions must be argued rather than discovered. For the advocate, the task is not to establish truth in the abstract, but to construct reasoning; logos that compels belief within a contested space.

In practice, logos is not reducible to formal logic or abstract syllogism. It is reasoning shaped for decision-making under constraint. Courts do not ask whether an argument is philosophically airtight; they ask whether it satisfies a burden of proof, coheres with the evidentiary record, and fits within an accepted legal framework. The advocate therefore operates in the space between logical validity and persuasive sufficiency: selecting, structuring, and presenting arguments that are not only internally sound but compelling to a particular audience. Logos, in this sense, is disciplined reasoning in context, anchored in the record, calibrated to legal standards, and directed toward judgment rather than abstract truth. Continue reading “Logos in Action: Building Persuasive Legal Reasoning”

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Disciplined Pathos: The Art of Restrained Emotional Persuasion Before Judges

The orator must not only teach, delight, and persuade; he must also move.  — Cicero

The most powerful moments of persuasion in a courtroom are rarely the loudest. Whether before a jury, a single judge, or an appellate bench, they tend to be quiet, controlled, and precise. They do not overwhelm. They settle in. Through deliberate rhetorical choices, an advocate can shape not only how a case is understood, but how it is experienced—without ever stepping outside the discipline the bench (chamber) demands. It is in these moments, as Cicero reminds us, that advocacy truly moves its audience.

This is especially so in international criminal tribunals, where persuasion unfolds before judges drawn from different legal systems, cultures, and professional traditions. In such a setting, advocacy requires more than doctrinal fluency. It requires an acute awareness of how arguments resonate across those differences. Continue reading “Disciplined Pathos: The Art of Restrained Emotional Persuasion Before Judges”

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REBUILDING ETHOS: Know How Judges Form Credibility Assessments in Real Time (Part III of the Effective Advocacy Trilogy)

You pursued a man only insofar as you can talk his language, by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his.


Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 53.

In Part I, I framed ethos as the foundation of persuasive advocacy — credibility established in real time. In Part II, I examined how it deteriorates: not through scandal, but through accumulation — overstatement, shading of the record, tonal slips, evasiveness, and small habits that quietly reshape how you are perceived.

Now comes the difficult question: once trust is strained, can it be restored?

WHY HOME MAINTENANCE IS IMPORTANT MservoWhile it can happen, it can’t be achieved through superficial fixes or mere pretense. Credibility doesn’t increase simply because we desire it to; judges are aware of what has occurred. Restoring trust requires a more solid foundation: acknowledging mistakes when necessary, exercising restraint when tempted, and maintaining consistent discipline over time. It involves behavior that shows reliability before seeking renewed confidence. Restoration is about actions, not words. Continue reading “REBUILDING ETHOS: Know How Judges Form Credibility Assessments in Real Time (Part III of the Effective Advocacy Trilogy)”

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HOW ADVOCATES LOSE ETHOS: A Gradual Erosion (Part II of the Effective Advocacy Trilogy)

[E]thos counts more than any other aspect of rhetoric because it puts your audience in the ideal state of persuadability. Cicero said you want them to be attentive, trusting, and willing to be persuaded. They’re more likely to be interested if they find you worth their attention. The trusting part goes with the ethical territory of cuse, craft, and caring. As for their willingness to be persuaded, you want them to consider you a role model-the essence of leadership. And where does this attitude come from? The same perceived traits: cause, craft, caring.


                                                      Jay Henrichs, Thank You for Arguing, p. 79

In my previous post, I explored ethos as the core of persuasive advocacy—credibility demonstrated through action. I emphasized that ethos is not your résumé. It is not seniority. It is not even reputation in the abstract. It is trust built in real time: sentence by sentence, answer by answer, concession by concession. It is the quiet but decisive assessment judges form about whether you are reliable.

And here is the uncomfortable truth: most advocates do not lose their ethos through dramatic misconduct. They lose it quietly. Gradually. Often without realizing it.

Saving Face vs Losing Face: Important Etiquette in AsiaFew advocates start their day intending to deceive the judges. Most are intelligent, conscientious, and genuinely dedicated to their clients and the pursuit of justice. However, credibility is rarely destroyed by major ethical violations. Instead, it is often damaged by small habits, subconscious impulses, and misguided strategic instincts—patterns that seem harmless on their own but become harmful over time. For example: adding an adjective for emphasis, framing a fact too strongly, citing an authority without full context, resisting a concession longer than necessary, or answering a question defensively instead of directly.

None of these, when considered alone, seems dreadful. But judges do not evaluate advocates in isolated moments. They assess patterns. They listen for proportionality. They observe tone. They note whether an advocate appears genuinely committed to helping them or just trying to win a debate, to score a point, or to pull a fast one over them. Continue reading “HOW ADVOCATES LOSE ETHOS: A Gradual Erosion (Part II of the Effective Advocacy Trilogy)”

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Effective Advocacy Trilogy: Ethos as Foundation, Erosion, and Restoration

Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible.


Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric

In my last two posts (here and here), I offered some foundational advice for appellate moot court participants—primarily those engaged in international law competitions. The focus there was on structure, clarity, responsiveness to the chamber, and the disciplined use of authority. Although framed in the context of moots, much of that guidance applies far beyond competition settings. Advocacy skills, after all, travel well—across jurisdictions, legal traditions, and levels of experience.

But appellate mooting is just one area. There are also trial moot court competitions that, like real trial advocacy, require a different mindset and skillset. They demand mastery not only of argument but also of examination, evidentiary judgment, narrative control, courtroom presence, and quick responsiveness. They call for agility in responding to witnesses, sensitivity to judicial intervention, and the ability to think strategically on the spot. These skills are not just for competition; they are transferable abilities that shape real-world litigation—whether in party-driven adversarial systems or judge-led civil law traditions.

Beyond competitions, I regularly engage in trial advocacy training—particularly in international and hybrid criminal courts and tribunals. I also lead training sessions in national jurisdictions, mainly for defense attorneys, and occasionally, I am consulted by both new and somewhat experienced advocates seeking advice on courtroom strategy, preparation, and persuasion. Through over forty years of practice and reflection, I’ve realized that although techniques evolve and procedural rules differ, certain core principles remain constant.

From time to time, I will share reflections based on experience—lessons learned in courtrooms, training rooms, and through observing what persuades and what does not. These reflections are offered humbly, not as strict formulas, but as practical guidance for those looking to improve their craft—whether prosecutors, defense attorneys, victim advocates, or aspiring advocates still finding their voice.

With that in mind, I believe every advocate should begin with one of Aristotle’s three powerful rhetorical tools of persuasion: ethos. Continue reading “Effective Advocacy Trilogy: Ethos as Foundation, Erosion, and Restoration”

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Fundamentals of Appellate Advocacy for Moot Court Participants Part II: Preparing for Moot Court Oral Advocacy

Don’t prepare to fail. Prepare only to win.


— Mehdi Hasan

In Part I, we explored how careful, disciplined drafting transforms a brief into a tool judges can actually use—how clarity, precision, ethical rigor, and structural logic make written advocacy credible and actionable. The same principles carry forward into oral argument. Persuasive appellate advocacy relies not on clever phrasing or theatrical delivery, but on clear thinking, preparation, and the ability to guide a decision-maker through complexity with confidence, restraint, and discipline.

The History of Oral Argument | Supreme Court Historical SocietySince persuasive oral advocacy depends on storytelling and the capacity to communicate with ease and clarity, I often start my advice to moot court participants and young lawyers with a familiar exercise: imagining a conversation with a stranger over drinks at a bar. This simple scenario tests an advocate’s understanding of the facts, the law, the issues, and the procedural context. More importantly, it challenges them to explain those elements clearly, succinctly, and persuasively to someone unfamiliar with the case, showing why each point matters. If your arguments can be understood—and appreciated—by a stranger, you are well on the path to guiding a bench.In this way, the exercise is both a mirror and a bridge: it reflects your mastery of the written brief developed in Part I while helping you turn that work into compelling oral advocacy. Continue reading “Fundamentals of Appellate Advocacy for Moot Court Participants Part II: Preparing for Moot Court Oral Advocacy”

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Fundamentals of Appellate Advocacy for Moot Court Participants — Part I: From Drafting Briefs to Courtroom Performance

Every year around this time, I hear from law students involved in moot court competitions seeking guidance. Some want help improving their briefs; others seek advice on oral argument. Last year, I was even invited to give a presentation on oral advocacy for an arbitration moot—an experience I found unexpectedly enjoyable. It took me back more than four decades, to my own days participating in an international moot court competition, long before the internet, Google, YouTube, or any of the digital resources students rely on today.

That sense of distance was enlightening. It reminded me of the challenges my partner and I faced throughout the competition, including in the final round—where we placed second overall after winning first prize for our written submission. It also led me to reflect on what has changed and what has not. Over the years, I have had the privilege of teaching law students and training practicing lawyers in trial and appellate advocacy. What experience has shown me is this: while the fundamentals of advocacy remain constant, effective persuasion requires attentiveness to the times and, above all, to the audience—the decision-makers themselves. Continue reading “Fundamentals of Appellate Advocacy for Moot Court Participants — Part I: From Drafting Briefs to Courtroom Performance”

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Defence Counsel Training at the ICC: A disorganized, under-resourced, afterthought

On 8 July 2025, I received a group email from “ICC Seminars” with an invitation to “Counsel admitted to the Court’s List of Counsel and the Court’s List of Assistants to participate in the upcoming hybrid Training for Counsel. This training will be held both online and at the Court from Tuesday, 23 September to Thursday, 25 September 2025.”  There is no limitation for on-line attendance.  The email stated a draft agenda would be shared in due course, while the invitation attachment said a draft agenda was attached.  It was not.  The email also advised that a link  would be available in “early September.”  As far as I know, neither has occurred.

Although the invitation states the “training is organised in collaboration with the ICC Bar Association and with funding from the European Union,” I see nothing about the training on the ICCBA website training or home pages.

With the training about 2 weeks away, I thought I’d share the below email I sent back that same day.


Dear CSS,

With all due respect, it’s genuinely difficult to understand how counsel are expected to commit their time, money, and professional energy to a training program when no information is provided—none—about the actual content. Is it really too much to expect that, before announcing an annual training (especially one that fills on a first-come, first-served basis), there would at least be a confirmed agenda and committed trainers?

After more than two decades of operation, one would reasonably expect CSS to have mastered the basics of planning and communication. This isn’t merely a matter of logistics or scheduling; it’s about respecting the time, financial constraints, and professional obligations of the very individuals the system depends on. Surely, we can all agree that counsel don’t attend these trainings for the hotel breakfast—they come to learn, to improve, to engage. That requires substance. And unfortunately, substance has too often been in short supply.

Over the years, I’ve tried—gently and not so gently—to convey two realities: first, that a large portion of counsel on the list still lack essential trial and appellate skills; and second, that the CSS annual training, more often than not, offers style over substance. Yet every year, I find myself watching the same last-minute scramble, the same absence of serious preparation, and the same missed opportunity for meaningful capacity-building. It’s become almost ritualistic.

Now, I understand there may be a lack of in-house expertise—after all, to my knowledge, no one within CSS has direct international trial or appellate experience. Fair enough. But that’s hardly a fatal obstacle. The field is rich with experienced counsel who are willing—eager, even—to contribute. So the continued reluctance to engage that expertise, to tap into the available resources, remains baffling. A mystery, really.

Until that changes, I’ll continue to express my concern—not out of habit or complaint, but because I care about the integrity of the profession and the quality of representation provided in international proceedings. And, as always, I remain entirely willing to assist in raising the standard—should anyone at CSS wish to take up the offer.

Respectfully but disappoint[ed]ly ,

Michael G. Karnavas


No response was forthcoming.

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Bringing practical applications of international criminal procedure into Prof. Joe Powderly’s classroom: should Leiden University (re)consider establishing a clinical program?

The young man knows the rules, but the old man knows the exceptions.


Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.

Judge Chamberlain Haller: All I ask from you is a very simple answer to a very simple question. There are only two ways to answer it: guilty or not guilty.


Attorney Vinny Gambini: But your honor, my clients didn’t do anything.


Judge Haller: Once again, the communication process broken down. It appears to me that you want to skip the arraignment process, go directly to trial, skip that, and get a dismissal. Well, I’m not about to revamp the entire judicial process just because you find yourself in the unique position of defending clients who say they didn’t do it.


My Cousin Vinny (film, 1992)

Universiteit LeidenIt was a delightful evening at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies at Leiden University Law School. The students came armed with serious questions. To my relief, none asked the usual how could I defend those people? or what if you know (or believe) your client is guilty? With the exception of one or two occasionally checking their smart phones, they seemed focused and interested. While I like to think my presentation had something to do with this, I believe the real reason is because these bright, motivated and prepared students were keen to hear about the practical applications of the theoretical substance of international criminal procedure.

For nearly three hours, I fielded questions. I went into the class with no prepared notes or plan. My intention was not to lecture but to provide the defence perspective on whatever topics interested them. The students have had a semester on international criminal law. This semester, well under way, is about the procedure. Prof. Powderly has brought other practitioners to give their perspectives and share their experiences. This evening, it was about the defence. The questions were practical, grounded and focused on issues related to the procedural rights of the accused. Continue reading “Bringing practical applications of international criminal procedure into Prof. Joe Powderly’s classroom: should Leiden University (re)consider establishing a clinical program?”

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THE IILAT ETHICS SYMPOSIUM AT THE ICC: Sharing views on professional responsibilities and working through ethical dilemmas

[I]f we have to find our way over difficult seas and under murky skies without a compass or chronometer, we need not on that account allow the ship to drive at random.


A. Balfour, The Foundations of Belief, Being Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology (Longman, Green & Co., New York, 1902), p. 244.

You need to know what you don’t know, to know what you need to know.


Michael G. Karnavas, Training Aphorism

On 13-14 March 2024, I was privileged to have been invited as a panelist to an ethics symposium held at the International Criminal Court (ICC), organized by the Institute for International Legal and Advocacy Training (IILAT).

Founded in 2013 in The Hague, IILAT’s mission over the years has been “to address the growing need for courtroom advocacy training at international courts and tribunals.” Training, which might I add, is practical, relevant, and qualitatively excellent – and badly needed, considering the importance of adversarial skills required in virtually all international(ized) criminal tribunals and courts (ICTs). As for this symposium, I found it exceptionally useful and insightful. Continue reading “THE IILAT ETHICS SYMPOSIUM AT THE ICC: Sharing views on professional responsibilities and working through ethical dilemmas”

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