Michael G. Karnavas, Author at michaelgkarnavas.net/Blog

Part II — THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UNENFORCEABLE: Points 2–21/26 & the Fantasy of Amnesty in the Putin-Trump “Peace Plan”

The International Criminal Court Statute is explicit on certain challenges to accountability such as superior orders, head of state immunity, and statute of limitations, but is silent both as to any duty to prosecute and with regard to amnesties. Although the issue was raised during the Rome Conference at which the Statute was adopted, no clear consensus developed among the delegates as to how the question should be resolved. This too suggests that customary international law had not crystallized on this point, at least not in 1998. —

Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 1022 (2006)

My initial reaction to Trump’s 28-point “peace plan,” created (or adopted, see Part I) by his inexperienced negotiation team, was not outrage or surprise but disbelief. I was genuinely astonished that four lawyers could produce (or claim ownership of) a document so legally incoherent, so fatally flawed, so flabbergasting, that it fails the laughing test. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are not just real estate magnates; they are lawyers in one of the most contract-heavy industries globally. Surely they understand the basics of their contractual arrangements: words matter, ambiguity is dangerous, contradictions are disastrous, and legal terms must be enforceable. When they step outside their expertise, they know to get advice from someone who isn’t. This isn’t advanced public international law; it’s basic ethics and professional responsibility. Continue reading “Part II — THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UNENFORCEABLE: Points 2–21/26 & the Fantasy of Amnesty in the Putin-Trump “Peace Plan” “

The Putin–Trump 28-Point “Peace Plan”: Part 1 – Appeasement by Another Name

In the days of our sorrow when others, more powerful, have decided to beggar our ancient country… It is not we who should be ashamed.

— Josef Hora

When the 28-point Putin–Trump “peace plan” surfaced, most of the world reacted with disbelief. Ukraine was given six days to accept it — an ultimatum masquerading as diplomacy. As reporting accumulated, a clearer picture emerged: the document appears to have been drafted by Putin’s envoy, translated into English, and delivered to Trump’s negotiating team, which adopted and repackaged it as its own. From there, it was presented to President Zelensky as the official U.S. framework for ending the war.

If Michael D. Weiss’s account in his Bulwark interview proves accurate, the 28 points were hammered out by Kirill Alexandrovich Dmitriev — one of Putin’s close associates—together with two real-estate developers, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The draft, written first in Russian and then translated, was passed back to the Kremlin and returned to Witkoff, who has reportedly been advising the Russians on how Putin should “handle” Trump, to be presented to the Ukrainians as a U.S. peace proposal. Continue reading “The Putin–Trump 28-Point “Peace Plan”: Part 1 – Appeasement by Another Name”

KHAN PART 2 — WHAT TO MAKE OF THE QATAR-LINKED “SPY-GATE” THAT TARGETED THE COMPLAINANT? Has the Time Come for ICC Prosecutor Khan to Resign or Be Eased Out?

The truth of the matter is that you always know the right thing to do. The hard part is doing it.

Robert H. Schuler

The International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor, Karim A. A. Khan KC, should take the honorable step of resigning – posthaste.

There is no way to soften the truth or the distastefulness of the situation. What the public now sees resembles the unraveling of a spy novel—competing narratives of misinformation and disinformation, suggestions of double agents, questionable witnesses, whispered talk of a honeytrap, and more. Some of this may be accurate; much of it likely not. But that is beside the point. The collateral damage already inflicted upon the ICC is unmistakable. A court that aspires to serve as the court of last resort now risks appearing as a parody of its own ideals.

The allegations against Khan, however they ultimately resolve, have already compromised his stature. Accusations of sexual assault or rape almost inevitably inflict enduring reputational injury, even if exoneration follows. Yet this is only part of the problem. The latest revelations concerning efforts to target or discredit the complainant – even without any evidence that Khan was directly or indirectly involved, whether personally or through intermediaries – cast an even deeper shadow over the institution, particularly over the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). Taken together, the Khan affair and the reported behind-the-scenes maneuvers aimed at pressuring or undermining the complainant constitute not merely an unfortunate distraction but a profound blow to the integrity, professionalism, and credibility expected of the Court’s chief prosecutor. Continue reading “KHAN PART 2 — WHAT TO MAKE OF THE QATAR-LINKED “SPY-GATE” THAT TARGETED THE COMPLAINANT? Has the Time Come for ICC Prosecutor Khan to Resign or Be Eased Out?”

KHAN PART 1 — WHEN OPACITY FRAMES PERCEPTIONS: Is the Karim Khan affair investigation being slow-walked to deep-six the results?

“… many accounts of bullying behaviour amounting to harassment in all Organs of the Court though particularly the OTP … complaints that the culture of the Court’s workplace was adversarial and implicitly discriminatory against women. … a number of accounts of sexual harassment, notably uninvited and unwanted sexual advances from more senior male staff to their female subordinates.”(para. 209.)

Independent Expert Review

Throughout its history, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has struggled with workplace harassment – not as an occasional lapse, but as a recurring, deeply rooted institutional problem. The issue is neither marginal nor conjectural. As the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) commissioned Independent Expert Review (discussed here), concluded in its 30 September 2020 Final Report, harassment – sexual and otherwise – was pervasive across the ICC and, within the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), virtually systemic. That the OTP emerged as the “gold medalist” in this ignominious category surprised few insiders at the time.

Yes, reforms have been undertaken, and yes, some progress has been made. But when a culture of harassment becomes embedded – tolerated, normalized, and allowed to proliferate – optimism must be tempered by realism. Eradicating a deep-rooted institutional malaise requires far more than rewritten policies or aspirational memos. It demands vigilance, transparency, and a willingness to confront misconduct at every level, including the highest.

This brings us to the present and the allegations against Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC (discussed here). To be clear, these are allegations; nothing has been proven. However, they include conduct that, in some national jurisdictions, could be classified as sexual assault or even rape. The possible permutations are limited: the encounter was consensual; it started consensually but became non-consensual; or it never happened and was fabricated. There are also claims of attempts to improperly influence the complainant and witnesses – conduct that, if true, could have Article 70 implications. Continue reading “KHAN PART 1 — WHEN OPACITY FRAMES PERCEPTIONS: Is the Karim Khan affair investigation being slow-walked to deep-six the results?”

Defence Counsel Training at the ICC: A disorganized, under-resourced, afterthought

On 8 July 2025, I received a group email from “ICC Seminars” with an invitation to “Counsel admitted to the Court’s List of Counsel and the Court’s List of Assistants to participate in the upcoming hybrid Training for Counsel. This training will be held both online and at the Court from Tuesday, 23 September to Thursday, 25 September 2025.” There is no limitation for on-line attendance. The email stated a draft agenda would be shared in due course, while the invitation attachment said a draft agenda was attached. It was not. The email also advised that a link would be available in “early September.” As far as I know, neither has occurred.

Although the invitation states the “training is organised in collaboration with the ICC Bar Association and with funding from the European Union,” I see nothing about the training on the ICCBA website training or home pages.

With the training about 2 weeks away, I thought I’d share the below email I sent back that same day.

Dear CSS,

With all due respect, it’s genuinely difficult to understand how counsel are expected to commit their time, money, and professional energy to a training program when no information is provided—none—about the actual content. Is it really too much to expect that, before announcing an annual training (especially one that fills on a first-come, first-served basis), there would at least be a confirmed agenda and committed trainers?

After more than two decades of operation, one would reasonably expect CSS to have mastered the basics of planning and communication. This isn’t merely a matter of logistics or scheduling; it’s about respecting the time, financial constraints, and professional obligations of the very individuals the system depends on. Surely, we can all agree that counsel don’t attend these trainings for the hotel breakfast—they come to learn, to improve, to engage. That requires substance. And unfortunately, substance has too often been in short supply.

Over the years, I’ve tried—gently and not so gently—to convey two realities: first, that a large portion of counsel on the list still lack essential trial and appellate skills; and second, that the CSS annual training, more often than not, offers style over substance. Yet every year, I find myself watching the same last-minute scramble, the same absence of serious preparation, and the same missed opportunity for meaningful capacity-building. It’s become almost ritualistic.

Now, I understand there may be a lack of in-house expertise—after all, to my knowledge, no one within CSS has direct international trial or appellate experience. Fair enough. But that’s hardly a fatal obstacle. The field is rich with experienced counsel who are willing—eager, even—to contribute. So the continued reluctance to engage that expertise, to tap into the available resources, remains baffling. A mystery, really.

Until that changes, I’ll continue to express my concern—not out of habit or complaint, but because I care about the integrity of the profession and the quality of representation provided in international proceedings. And, as always, I remain entirely willing to assist in raising the standard—should anyone at CSS wish to take up the offer.

Respectfully but disappoint[ed]ly ,

Michael G. Karnavas

No response was forthcoming.

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When Critique Becomes Caricature: A Response to James Radcliffe

Having already clarified my original post — Sanctions as Stimulative Measures: A Sovereign Prerogative Untethered from Moral Discernment — and followed it with Deserve’s Got Nothing to Do with It: A Response to Critiques of My Views on U.S. Sanctions and the ICC, I had not intended to revisit the matter. These were rare indulgences, prompted by private messages from colleagues whose intellect I respect. But Mr. James Radcliffe, apparently of the University of New South Wales, has now contributed a comment so drenched in bile and devoid of reasoned argument that, regrettably, another response is necessary. Continue reading “When Critique Becomes Caricature: A Response to James Radcliffe”

THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part II: Sovereignty, Paralysis, the Future of International Law & the Confluence of Unpredictable Events

But suppose the safety of the State is endangered; our foresight can not extend too far. Are we to delay averting our destruction until it has become inevitable?… If an unknown man takes aim at me in the middle of a forest I am not yet certain that he wishes to kill me; must I allow him time to fire in order to be sure of his intent? Is there any reasonable casuist who would deny me the right to forestall the act?… Must we await he danger? Must we let the storm gather strength when it might be scattered at its rising?

Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758), 248-249

Resuming and Recontextualizing

The legal and strategic implications of Israel’s aerial offensive inside Iran – unprecedented in both scope and timing – are difficult to overstate. This was not retaliation. There was no missile barrage, no chemical warhead in the sky, no mass-casualty provocation. Ramadan had just ended. The region was diplomatically active, not ablaze. American, French, and Saudi officials were brokering normalization talks between Israel and Riyadh. The West wanted calm.

Netanyahu chose escalation.

Or did he?

The Pre-Emptive Strike in Self Defense Look closer, and the logic begins to snap into place – albeit under intense scrutiny and through a narrow legal aperture. There was no armed attack that might clearly trigger the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Israel acted not in response to violence, but to intelligence. This was anticipatory self-defense: a controversial exception to the general prohibition on the use of force. The legal test for self-defence– drawn from the 19th-century Caroline doctrine and later jurisprudence – demands that the necessity of self-defense be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Continue reading “THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part II: Sovereignty, Paralysis, the Future of International Law & the Confluence of Unpredictable Events”

THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part I: Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Nuclear Age

Nothing under international law may justify these armed attacks and the deliberate targeting of protected civilians.

Saïd Benarbia, ICJ Middle East and North Africa Programme Director

I do not agree that the terms or intent of Article 51 eliminate the right of self-defence under customary international law…

Judge Schwebel, dissenting, ICJ Nicaragua case (1986)

Prolegomena

Israel’s June 2025 unilateral attack on Iran’s nuclear program tests the boundaries of self-defence in a world the UN Charter wasn’t built to govern. For decades, Israeli policy has emphasized that it will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The strikes fulfilled that doctrine. It followed years of diplomacy, sabotage, and shadow war. And it came after repeated warnings that Iran had crossed enrichment thresholds and could reach nuclear breakout within months. That moment, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued, demanded immediate action.

Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, states are prohibited from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state. The only explicit exception is found in Article 51: the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.”

Israel has not claimed that Iran launched a missile or invaded its territory. Instead, it argues that a nuclear Iran would present an irreversible threat—one that could not be deterred, reversed, or neutralized once operational.

This raises a foundational question: What kind of threat justifies the use of force in self-defence before an actual armed attack? Or more sharply: Can international law afford to wait for the flash of a nuclear detonation before permitting a state to act? Continue reading “THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part I: Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Nuclear Age”

Deserve’s Got Nothin’ to Do with It — A response to critiques of my views on U.S. sanctions and the ICC

Advanced Vocabulary for English Language Learners: To get an earful Wow did I get an earful after my post on sanctions against the ICC! And in many cases it came from those I hold in the highest esteem. As expected, most of the criticism directed at my post was steeped more in emotion than in cold, fact-based logic or a sober assessment of geopolitical reality. That’s not a criticism in itself — emotion has its place, especially when discussing justice and law. But emotion, however righteous, cannot override structural power dynamics.

I genuinely commend those who, in Churchillian fashion, continue to defend the ICC, international criminal justice, judicial independence, and the integrity of the Prosecutor. I agree with those values. I said so in my previous post — if read without the haze of moral indignation and with a modicum of intellectual generosity. Perhaps I wasn’t explicit enough. Perhaps I was too restrained in my use of adjectives and adverbs. Perhaps I didn’t indulge in enough rhetorical fire to pass the purity test of those whose compass points only to the ideal. Perhaps. But I think not. Continue reading “Deserve’s Got Nothin’ to Do with It — A response to critiques of my views on U.S. sanctions and the ICC”

SANCTIONS AS STIMULATIVE MEASURES: a sovereign prerogative untethered from moral discernment

Little Bill Daggett: I don’t deserve this… to die like this. I was building a house.

Bill Munny: Deserve’s got nothin’ to do with it.

Little Bill Daggett: I’ll see you in hell, William Munny.

Bill Munny: Yeah.

Unforgiven (1992)[/otw_shortcode_quote]

It is what it is. Don’t shoot the messenger.

Bending another state or institution (such as the International Criminal Court (ICC)) to the will of a more powerful sanctioning state may be distasteful, distressing, disadvantageous (depending on the side of the cause for the sanctions one is aligned with) but the harsh reality is that the use of sanctions is a sovereign prerogative. The sooner this reality is accepted and embraced, the sooner the sanctioned state or institution, along with their cast of supporting states, international and regional organizations, civil society, concerned global citizens can accept the need to explore realizable off-ramps or condition themselves to endure the consequences of the sanctions.

Why it is what it is

Reality is harsh. Powerful and well-positioned states resort to sanctions when it suits their interests. Imposing them may leave a might makes right stench in the nostrils, but it is what it is. Getting emotional, crying foul, engaging in hyperbolic condemnations, calling out the hypocritical and inconsistent use of sanctions against foes for conduct and causes that the sanctioning state engages in or tolerates and even supports when friends and allies do likewise, is not a strategy. It is a reaction. Continue reading “SANCTIONS AS STIMULATIVE MEASURES: a sovereign prerogative untethered from moral discernment”