Current Events Archives - michaelgkarnavas.net/Blog

THE ICC AT AN INFLECTION POINT: But Which One?

Individuals alleging sexual violence often don’t report because they perceive – in many cases, correctly – the justice system as not being genuinely responsive to them.… In the case of Mr Khan, however, the bureau established an ad hoc process specifically for this complaint, and worked to ensure there was a victim-centred approach in a system that also respected due process. That is apparent in both the OIOS investigation and in the lengthy reasoned analysis of the eminent panel of jurists. If the Bureau starts to step away from the reasoned and unanimous analysis of the judges, they open up a conversation about whether the process that they established is founded upon law and due process, or on politics and power.

— Sareta Ashraph, lead counsel for Karim A. A. Khan

Perhaps it is a touch indecorous to weigh in on L’Affaire Khan now that the matter has moved into disciplinary territory and beyond the rather transparent lobbying by Ashraph and assorted proxies urging the ICC Bureau to adopt, without reservation, the findings of the three judicial experts.

With the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) now effectively holding the reins, the question presents itself in the terms Ashraph has framed it: is this an inflection point? Will any deviation from the panel’s findings “open up a conversation” about whether the process is grounded in law and due process—or in politics and power?

A debate will be had. That much is inevitable. And, frankly, healthy.

But an inflection point? An existential moment for the ICC? I think not. That characterization owes more to advocacy than analysis. Continue reading “THE ICC AT AN INFLECTION POINT: But Which One?”

DEBUNKING ILLUSIONS: What ICC Delay Tells Us About Power, Politics, and Prosecutorial Choice — Part II of INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS

This is Part II of my series: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: A Realist’s View on the ICC’s Limitations.

Read Part I here.

Part II

Instead of lamenting that the United States might prosecute Nicolás Maduro before the International Criminal Court (ICC) ever does, a more honest—and more uncomfortable—question should be asked: why did an institution created to confront mass atrocities fail to act with urgency when it mattered most?

Much of the commentary on Maduro’s potential prosecution relies on the idea that international justice follows a single moral timeline, with the ICC as its natural pinnacle. From this view, some see national proceedings as nothing more than distractions at best, or hurdles at worst. This perspective is not only legally flawed; it is also institutionally evasive. It shifts focus away from the ICC’s own history of delays, selectivity, and strategic hesitation, and instead blames others for inaction. Continue reading “DEBUNKING ILLUSIONS: What ICC Delay Tells Us About Power, Politics, and Prosecutorial Choice — Part II of INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS”

JUSTICE DELAYED, JUSTICE MYTHOLOGIZED: Maduro, the ICC, and the Perils of Justice Without Power — Part I of INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS

INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: A Realist’s View on the ICC’s Limitations

International criminal justice navigates a delicate balance between aspiration and authority. It invokes the language of universality but functions within a realm shaped by power, sovereignty, and uneven enforcement. This tension is most evident in discussions about the ICC, national prosecutions, and claims that domestic actions “undermine” or “obstruct” international justice.

Starting with the arrest of Nicolás Maduro and the possibility of an ICC sealed arrest warrant, I examine a straightforward yet frequently challenged concept: international criminal law is intertwined with geopolitics rather than existing above it. The ICC was never designed to control power, supersede sovereign jurisdictions, or hold complete accountability. Its authority depends on conditions, its enforcement varies, and its impact is influenced as much by political factors as by legal rules.

Rather than mourning these limitations, I advocate for honest confrontation. This approach does not undermine international justice; it enhances it. The real question is not whether the ICC is important, but what it can practically accomplish, when, and at what expense. Only by discarding comforting illusions can international criminal law establish itself as a credible and lasting endeavor.

This two-part series deliberately transitions from doctrine to delay, then to power, offering a realist perspective on what international criminal justice can—and cannot—accomplish in a world governed by sovereignty and strategic interests. My main argument is that international justice doesn’t fail because national jurisdictions act; it fails when symbolic aspiration is mistaken for real enforcement capabilities. Uneven accountability reflects uneven power, but this does not undermine international law; instead, it grounds it in reality. Naturally, these issues are complex and merit detailed, nuanced analysis, which this brief series cannot provide. Hopefully, however, it encourages discussion on what international criminal law, international criminal tribunals, especially the ICC, can realistically achieve. Continue reading “JUSTICE DELAYED, JUSTICE MYTHOLOGIZED: Maduro, the ICC, and the Perils of Justice Without Power — Part I of INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS”

Part II — THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UNENFORCEABLE: Points 2–21/26 & the Fantasy of Amnesty in the Putin-Trump “Peace Plan”

The International Criminal Court Statute is explicit on certain challenges to accountability such as superior orders, head of state immunity, and statute of limitations, but is silent both as to any duty to prosecute and with regard to amnesties. Although the issue was raised during the Rome Conference at which the Statute was adopted, no clear consensus developed among the delegates as to how the question should be resolved. This too suggests that customary international law had not crystallized on this point, at least not in 1998. —

Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 1022 (2006)

My initial reaction to Trump’s 28-point “peace plan,” created (or adopted, see Part I) by his inexperienced negotiation team, was not outrage or surprise but disbelief. I was genuinely astonished that four lawyers could produce (or claim ownership of) a document so legally incoherent, so fatally flawed, so flabbergasting, that it fails the laughing test. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are not just real estate magnates; they are lawyers in one of the most contract-heavy industries globally. Surely they understand the basics of their contractual arrangements: words matter, ambiguity is dangerous, contradictions are disastrous, and legal terms must be enforceable. When they step outside their expertise, they know to get advice from someone who isn’t. This isn’t advanced public international law; it’s basic ethics and professional responsibility. Continue reading “Part II — THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UNENFORCEABLE: Points 2–21/26 & the Fantasy of Amnesty in the Putin-Trump “Peace Plan” “

The Putin–Trump 28-Point “Peace Plan”: Part 1 – Appeasement by Another Name

In the days of our sorrow when others, more powerful, have decided to beggar our ancient country… It is not we who should be ashamed.

— Josef Hora

When the 28-point Putin–Trump “peace plan” surfaced, most of the world reacted with disbelief. Ukraine was given six days to accept it — an ultimatum masquerading as diplomacy. As reporting accumulated, a clearer picture emerged: the document appears to have been drafted by Putin’s envoy, translated into English, and delivered to Trump’s negotiating team, which adopted and repackaged it as its own. From there, it was presented to President Zelensky as the official U.S. framework for ending the war.

If Michael D. Weiss’s account in his Bulwark interview proves accurate, the 28 points were hammered out by Kirill Alexandrovich Dmitriev — one of Putin’s close associates—together with two real-estate developers, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The draft, written first in Russian and then translated, was passed back to the Kremlin and returned to Witkoff, who has reportedly been advising the Russians on how Putin should “handle” Trump, to be presented to the Ukrainians as a U.S. peace proposal. Continue reading “The Putin–Trump 28-Point “Peace Plan”: Part 1 – Appeasement by Another Name”

When Critique Becomes Caricature: A Response to James Radcliffe

Having already clarified my original post — Sanctions as Stimulative Measures: A Sovereign Prerogative Untethered from Moral Discernment — and followed it with Deserve’s Got Nothing to Do with It: A Response to Critiques of My Views on U.S. Sanctions and the ICC, I had not intended to revisit the matter. These were rare indulgences, prompted by private messages from colleagues whose intellect I respect. But Mr. James Radcliffe, apparently of the University of New South Wales, has now contributed a comment so drenched in bile and devoid of reasoned argument that, regrettably, another response is necessary. Continue reading “When Critique Becomes Caricature: A Response to James Radcliffe”

THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part II: Sovereignty, Paralysis, the Future of International Law & the Confluence of Unpredictable Events

But suppose the safety of the State is endangered; our foresight can not extend too far. Are we to delay averting our destruction until it has become inevitable?… If an unknown man takes aim at me in the middle of a forest I am not yet certain that he wishes to kill me; must I allow him time to fire in order to be sure of his intent? Is there any reasonable casuist who would deny me the right to forestall the act?… Must we await he danger? Must we let the storm gather strength when it might be scattered at its rising?

Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758), 248-249

Resuming and Recontextualizing

The legal and strategic implications of Israel’s aerial offensive inside Iran – unprecedented in both scope and timing – are difficult to overstate. This was not retaliation. There was no missile barrage, no chemical warhead in the sky, no mass-casualty provocation. Ramadan had just ended. The region was diplomatically active, not ablaze. American, French, and Saudi officials were brokering normalization talks between Israel and Riyadh. The West wanted calm.

Netanyahu chose escalation.

Or did he?

The Pre-Emptive Strike in Self Defense Look closer, and the logic begins to snap into place – albeit under intense scrutiny and through a narrow legal aperture. There was no armed attack that might clearly trigger the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Israel acted not in response to violence, but to intelligence. This was anticipatory self-defense: a controversial exception to the general prohibition on the use of force. The legal test for self-defence– drawn from the 19th-century Caroline doctrine and later jurisprudence – demands that the necessity of self-defense be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Continue reading “THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part II: Sovereignty, Paralysis, the Future of International Law & the Confluence of Unpredictable Events”

THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part I: Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Nuclear Age

Nothing under international law may justify these armed attacks and the deliberate targeting of protected civilians.

Saïd Benarbia, ICJ Middle East and North Africa Programme Director

I do not agree that the terms or intent of Article 51 eliminate the right of self-defence under customary international law…

Judge Schwebel, dissenting, ICJ Nicaragua case (1986)

Prolegomena

Israel’s June 2025 unilateral attack on Iran’s nuclear program tests the boundaries of self-defence in a world the UN Charter wasn’t built to govern. For decades, Israeli policy has emphasized that it will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The strikes fulfilled that doctrine. It followed years of diplomacy, sabotage, and shadow war. And it came after repeated warnings that Iran had crossed enrichment thresholds and could reach nuclear breakout within months. That moment, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued, demanded immediate action.

Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, states are prohibited from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state. The only explicit exception is found in Article 51: the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.”

Israel has not claimed that Iran launched a missile or invaded its territory. Instead, it argues that a nuclear Iran would present an irreversible threat—one that could not be deterred, reversed, or neutralized once operational.

This raises a foundational question: What kind of threat justifies the use of force in self-defence before an actual armed attack? Or more sharply: Can international law afford to wait for the flash of a nuclear detonation before permitting a state to act? Continue reading “THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part I: Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Nuclear Age”

Deserve’s Got Nothin’ to Do with It — A response to critiques of my views on U.S. sanctions and the ICC

Advanced Vocabulary for English Language Learners: To get an earful Wow did I get an earful after my post on sanctions against the ICC! And in many cases it came from those I hold in the highest esteem. As expected, most of the criticism directed at my post was steeped more in emotion than in cold, fact-based logic or a sober assessment of geopolitical reality. That’s not a criticism in itself — emotion has its place, especially when discussing justice and law. But emotion, however righteous, cannot override structural power dynamics.

I genuinely commend those who, in Churchillian fashion, continue to defend the ICC, international criminal justice, judicial independence, and the integrity of the Prosecutor. I agree with those values. I said so in my previous post — if read without the haze of moral indignation and with a modicum of intellectual generosity. Perhaps I wasn’t explicit enough. Perhaps I was too restrained in my use of adjectives and adverbs. Perhaps I didn’t indulge in enough rhetorical fire to pass the purity test of those whose compass points only to the ideal. Perhaps. But I think not. Continue reading “Deserve’s Got Nothin’ to Do with It — A response to critiques of my views on U.S. sanctions and the ICC”

SANCTIONS AS STIMULATIVE MEASURES: a sovereign prerogative untethered from moral discernment

Little Bill Daggett: I don’t deserve this… to die like this. I was building a house.

Bill Munny: Deserve’s got nothin’ to do with it.

Little Bill Daggett: I’ll see you in hell, William Munny.

Bill Munny: Yeah.

Unforgiven (1992)[/otw_shortcode_quote]

It is what it is. Don’t shoot the messenger.

Bending another state or institution (such as the International Criminal Court (ICC)) to the will of a more powerful sanctioning state may be distasteful, distressing, disadvantageous (depending on the side of the cause for the sanctions one is aligned with) but the harsh reality is that the use of sanctions is a sovereign prerogative. The sooner this reality is accepted and embraced, the sooner the sanctioned state or institution, along with their cast of supporting states, international and regional organizations, civil society, concerned global citizens can accept the need to explore realizable off-ramps or condition themselves to endure the consequences of the sanctions.

Why it is what it is

Reality is harsh. Powerful and well-positioned states resort to sanctions when it suits their interests. Imposing them may leave a might makes right stench in the nostrils, but it is what it is. Getting emotional, crying foul, engaging in hyperbolic condemnations, calling out the hypocritical and inconsistent use of sanctions against foes for conduct and causes that the sanctioning state engages in or tolerates and even supports when friends and allies do likewise, is not a strategy. It is a reaction. Continue reading “SANCTIONS AS STIMULATIVE MEASURES: a sovereign prerogative untethered from moral discernment”