Just How Relevant is the ICC – Part VII and Conclusion

This multi-part blog post is drawn from Michael G. Karnavas’s Lecture at the Brown University International Organization (BRIO) February 26, 2014.  The complete piece is available on Michael’s website.

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h. Syria

Bashar Al Assad
Bashar Al-Assad

Finally, it was time to focus on Syria: what are the realistic prospects of Bashar Al-Assad and others being prosecuted at the ICC?  Recalling how a case comes before the ICC, I noted that it was highly unlikely that Assad or others would end up at The Hague any time soon, if at all.  Syria has not signed on to the Rome Statute.[1]  This Syrian government is not about to agree to ICC jurisdiction.  Assuming the Assad regime falls, the next government would be poised to ask the ICC to investigate and prosecute, but given that all sides to the conflict seem to be committing mass atrocities, it does call into question whether there would be a genuine desire to get the ICC involved.  The Security Council is unlikely to refer the matter to the ICC Prosecutor, when it cannot even agree on the need to intervene for humanitarian reasons.[2]  But hope springs eternal.  Theoretically, nothing can be precluded.

Interestingly, two separate initiatives perhaps reveal just how ineffectual the ICC is or is perceived to be.  The first one is an initiative by a so-called Blue Ribbon Panel of Experts who drafted a statute for a tribunal, which presumably would function very much like the State court in Bosnia and Herzegovina or the ECCC.[3]  It is called the “Chautauqua Blueprint.”[4]  In theory, this court, were it to ever be established, would be functioning in Syria with national and perhaps international judges, prosecutors and lawyers.[5]  It would be responsible for all accused, from the very top, to the most responsible, to the middle and low range, prosecuting all sides without passion or prejudice.[6]  The Tribunal would be complementary to any criminal or military courts in Syria.[7]  Alternatively, it would operate as a spill-over court, prosecuting anyone that was not prosecuted by the ICC, were the ICC to be involved.  Of course, this scenario is also fraught with problems, since it would require setting up an independent and impartial tribunal in situ; a real challenge.  Were it to be set up outside Syria, the challenges would be just as daunting, when considering costs, security issues, and witness protection measures.  Financing the tribunal is also a major issue.  Unlike the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Chautauqua Blueprint or initiative envisages trying a significant number of perpetrators.  Financing such an initiative over a period of years would require a very deep pocket.  But as past experience shows (and the ECCC is a good example), donor fatigue sets in relatively fast even when the cause is deemed noble.[8]

The other initiative is even more reflective of just how little faith some have for the ICC.  It is an initiative by members of the US Congress.[9]  The initiative calls for the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal similar to the ICTY and ICTR.[10]  Of course, this too would require UN Security Council approval, since the tribunal would need to be established under Chapter VII, but then the added bonus would be that the P5 would control the jurisdiction (and budget) of the tribunal – something they are unable to do with the ICC.  But here too we are talking about considerable costs and practical difficulties in setting up an entire new judicial regime including: finding the space, appointing the judges and prosecutor, and selecting all the requisite personnel.  Even if this initiative is realized, is this not a duplication of what the ICC was meant to do?  Would setting up a post-ICC ad hoc tribunal not further undermine the ICC’s credibility?  Or better yet, does this initiative not speak of the little regard in which the ICC is held?  Obviously, one has to consider the source of this initiative and the distrust the US officials (and military) have for the ICC as an objective, fair and well-functioning institution.  Much can be said of this.  But when considering that in the past 12 years the ICC has only been able to complete  two trials despite the hundreds of millions of dollars spent, there are legitimate reasons to believe that the ICC is, at least for the time being, ineffectual and dysfunctional.

III. CONCLUSION

After addressing many interesting questions and exchanging views on a number of issues, the students were asked to draw their own conclusions on just how viable the ICC is at the moment. The vignettes were provided merely to provoke thought and stimulate discourse.  The ICC is being politicized despite fancying itself as the court of last resort.  But is this cause to conclude that even as dysfunctional as it may be at the moment, it will morph into a politicized court of low expectations?  While it is tempting to answer in the affirmative, it not only is premature, it may also be unfair to single out the ICC as being or becoming a politicized judicial institution.  All of the other international tribunals, starting with Nuremberg, were highly politicized.  That said, the ICC needs to get its act together.  And the sooner the better.



[1] U.N. Treaty Collection, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Ratifications and Signatories, (last visited 10 March 2014), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en.

[2] Michael G. Karnavas, Red Lines and Game Changers—The Legality of Unilateral or Collective Use of Force in Syria, Michael G. Karnavas Blog (March 2014), http://www.michaelgkarnavas.net/files/BrownUSeminar_27Feb14.pdf.

[3] Julian Ku, Putting the Cart Before the Horse? Top Panel of International Criminal Law Experts Proposes “Extraordinary” Criminal Tribunal for Syria, Opinio Juris (27 September 2013, 9:14 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/27/putting-cart-horse-top-panel-international-criminal-law-experts-proposes-ad-hoc-hybrid-criminal-tribunal-syria/.

[4] Blue Ribbon Panel of Experts, The Chautauqua Blueprint for a Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute Atrocity Crimes, (27 August 2013), available at http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Chautauqua-Blueprint1.pdf.

[5] Id., art. 3.

[6] Id., art. 1.

[7] Id., Preamble.

[8] See Joel Brinkley, Justice Squandered: Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Tribunal, World Affairs (October 2013), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/justice-squandered-cambodia%E2%80%99s-khmer-rouge-tribunal. Brinkley notes the donor fatigue in the ECCC, where very little money has been raised. In spring 2013, the Tribunal’s Cambodian staff went on strike as they were not paid since November of the previous year. Without staff, including court reports and translators, the court cannot function and will shut down. The Court management system promised to pay the staff “sometime soon.” The Cambodian staff went back to work but vowed to quit if the promise was not kept. International officials pointed out that the Cambodian government was responsible for paying workers. However, Cambodia not be unhappy were the court shut down.

[9] See H.R. Con. Res. 51, 113th Cong. (2013).

[10] Id. “Whereas ad hoc tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, have successfully investigated and prosecuted war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and there are many positive lessons to be learned from these three ad hoc tribunals . . . the President should direct the United States  representative to the United Nations to use the voice and vote  of the United States to immediately promote the establishment of a Syrian war crimes tribunal, an ad hoc court to prosecute the perpetrators of such serious crimes committed during the civil war in Syria.”

 

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Author: Michael G. Karnavas

Michael G. Karnavas is an American trained lawyer. He is licensed in Alaska and Massachusetts and is qualified to appear before the various International tribunals, including the International Criminal Court (ICC). Residing and practicing primarily in The Hague, he is recognized as an expert in international criminal defence, including pre-trial, trial, and appellate advocacy.

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