In armed conflicts between sovereign states of conspicuously unequal capacities there is sometimes a particular kind of unequal application, or rather abuse, of the law. Some relatively less powerful states (as well as non-state bodies) have engaged in consistently unlawful operations against the more powerful adversary such as hostage-taking, co-location of their military objects with civilian objects, use of human shields, use of suicide bombers disguised as civilians, indiscriminate attacks, use of proxy forces to engage in unlawful operations while denying all responsibility for their actions and deliberate attacks on civilians. Such unlawful operations have been prevalent during the period of US military dominance since the end of the Cold War, and can be seen as a response to the US ability to fight war from the air with impunity and with a high degree of accuracy. In many cases, they are intended to lure the United States and its coalition partners into causing civilian damage and incurring international criticism: as such, they are part of what Charlie Dunlap of the US Air Force has called ‘lawfare’, or ‘the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional means to achieve an operational objective’.
Adam Roberts((Adam Roberts, The equal application of the laws of war: a principle under pressure, 90(872) International Review of the Red Cross 931, 949-950 (2008). ))
The laws of war – aka “law of armed conflict” or “international humanitarian law”– at times fall short of their intended purpose. They are imprecise in providing exacting guidance. They afford vague margins of discretion to what may seem, semantically, to be malleable standards, and may reflect over‑permissiveness of conduct incongruous with moral philosophy’s meaning of justice and the nature of the good life (or the good war). But they are reflective of and consistent with the realities faced by those who must apply them in the war theater, as opposed to paradigmatically in a classroom amphitheater. Nonetheless, the facilitative aspect of laws of war, i.e., that which it aims to achieve – whether viewed from a prohibitive lens or a permissive lens – carries the imprimatur of moral acceptability, however imperfect or unsatisfying. Continue reading “THE DARK SIDE OF ADHERING TO THE LAWS OF WAR: The seeming unfairness of taking the legal and moral high-ground”
Palestine cannot have it both ways. As a State Party, it cannot expect the ICC to investigate crimes alleged to have been committed against Palestinians by Israel (through the Israeli Defense Forces), yet not be held to account for crimes alleged to have been committed by Hamas against Israelis.
Much can be said about the politics of international criminal justice, the tolerated/excused hypocrisy in the behavior of certain states (in particular the permanent five members of the UN Security Council), and yes, the callousness or indifference or obliviousness in viewing, accepting, and even promoting inequity. We often tend to justify or minimize inaction or overreaction or selective action when it either suits us or when we lazily adopt a so what or a that’s the way things are attitude. Even when occasionally we truly believe something is off-kilter, irreconcilable, or just plain wrong, we rarely are willing to call it for what it is, to speak truth to power, to dare voice an unpopular position because it is simply the right thing to do. With no agenda in mind, here are a couple of matters worth expressing, however seemingly distasteful it may be to criticize anything related to Ukraine and its efforts in seeking peace and justice. 
Most agree that Putin’s war-making was unprovoked, unjustified, and unlawful. I say most because there are some who believe that Russia had legitimate reasons for initiating what Putin has characterized as Russia’s “special military operation.” Most also agree – or seem to agree despite any legitimate findings by an independent international tribunal – that Putin is guilty beyond any doubt of the crime of aggression. And many of those who have made their findings and conclusions of Putin’s guilt, call for the establishment of a tribunal with the singular purpose to try and convict Putin, expeditiously, for aggression. Of course, they envisage that a few others would also be charged and tried as well for aggression, but Putin is the great white whale (though it should be remembered that Moby Dick was both Ahab’s obsession and the prize he could not have). 