In armed conflicts between sovereign states of conspicuously unequal capacities there is sometimes a particular kind of unequal application, or rather abuse, of the law. Some relatively less powerful states (as well as non-state bodies) have engaged in consistently unlawful operations against the more powerful adversary such as hostage-taking, co-location of their military objects with civilian objects, use of human shields, use of suicide bombers disguised as civilians, indiscriminate attacks, use of proxy forces to engage in unlawful operations while denying all responsibility for their actions and deliberate attacks on civilians. Such unlawful operations have been prevalent during the period of US military dominance since the end of the Cold War, and can be seen as a response to the US ability to fight war from the air with impunity and with a high degree of accuracy. In many cases, they are intended to lure the United States and its coalition partners into causing civilian damage and incurring international criticism: as such, they are part of what Charlie Dunlap of the US Air Force has called ‘lawfare’, or ‘the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional means to achieve an operational objective’.
Adam Roberts((Adam Roberts, The equal application of the laws of war: a principle under pressure, 90(872) International Review of the Red Cross 931, 949-950 (2008). ))
The laws of war – aka “law of armed conflict” or “international humanitarian law”– at times fall short of their intended purpose. They are imprecise in providing exacting guidance. They afford vague margins of discretion to what may seem, semantically, to be malleable standards, and may reflect over‑permissiveness of conduct incongruous with moral philosophy’s meaning of justice and the nature of the good life (or the good war). But they are reflective of and consistent with the realities faced by those who must apply them in the war theater, as opposed to paradigmatically in a classroom amphitheater. Nonetheless, the facilitative aspect of laws of war, i.e., that which it aims to achieve – whether viewed from a prohibitive lens or a permissive lens – carries the imprimatur of moral acceptability, however imperfect or unsatisfying. Continue reading “THE DARK SIDE OF ADHERING TO THE LAWS OF WAR: The seeming unfairness of taking the legal and moral high-ground”

Palestine cannot have it both ways. As a State Party, it cannot expect the ICC to investigate crimes alleged to have been committed against Palestinians by Israel (through the Israeli Defense Forces), yet not be held to account for crimes alleged to have been committed by Hamas against Israelis. 

Article 7(2) of the ICC Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel (Code) presumes that list counsel possess a high level of knowledge of the applicable law and a high level of skills required for the adopted party-driven, adversarial hybrid procedure, and thus must “participate in training initiatives required to maintain such competence.” This presumption is fanciful. Not all list counsel are sufficiently competent – let alone to a high level – simply because they have managed to get themselves on the list. Counsel cannot “maintain a high level of competence” unless they are already competent to a high level. Query whose responsibility is it to ensure that at least those counsel appearing in proceedings before the ICC have a high level of competence. In no small measure I suggest it is the ICC Registrar, through the Counsel Support Section (CSS), which is responsible for setting the standards for the admission of counsel.