The interpretation of the Rome Statute is governed by the provisions of articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The relevant provisions must be interpreted systematically, taking into account the object and purpose of the Statute, which is to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes. (para. 1, underlined added)
Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Rodrigo Roa Duterte against Pre-Trial Chamber’s “Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction on the Courts” of 23 October 2025
Legal texts, much like religious ones, rarely yield a single intelligible meaning. They invite interpretation; they sustain it. In doing so, they inevitably reflect not only the words on the page but also the institutional instincts, interpretive philosophy, and normative priorities of those tasked with applying them.
The Rome Statute is no exception. Perspective matters. Purpose matters. And institutional orientation – especially in a court expressly created to confront atrocity crimes – matters profoundly.
When adjudication is guided by a strong commitment to the Statute’s anti-impunity mandate, the interpretive method can shift subtly yet decisively. Textual ambiguities no longer appear as limits; they begin to resemble obstacles. Procedural distinctions no longer function as safeguards; they begin to appear as technicalities that can frustrate the Statute’s overarching purpose. Continue reading “THE DUTERTE JURISDICTIONAL JUDGMENT: Foreboding Questions for the ICC’s Jurisdictional Future “