But suppose the safety of the State is endangered; our foresight can not extend too far. Are we to delay averting our destruction until it has become inevitable?… If an unknown man takes aim at me in the middle of a forest I am not yet certain that he wishes to kill me; must I allow him time to fire in order to be sure of his intent? Is there any reasonable casuist who would deny me the right to forestall the act?… Must we await he danger? Must we let the storm gather strength when it might be scattered at its rising?
Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758), 248-249
Resuming and Recontextualizing
The legal and strategic implications of Israel’s aerial offensive inside Iran – unprecedented in both scope and timing – are difficult to overstate. This was not retaliation. There was no missile barrage, no chemical warhead in the sky, no mass-casualty provocation. Ramadan had just ended. The region was diplomatically active, not ablaze. American, French, and Saudi officials were brokering normalization talks between Israel and Riyadh. The West wanted calm.
Netanyahu chose escalation.
Or did he?
Look closer, and the logic begins to snap into place – albeit under intense scrutiny and through a narrow legal aperture. There was no armed attack that might clearly trigger the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Israel acted not in response to violence, but to intelligence. This was anticipatory self-defense: a controversial exception to the general prohibition on the use of force. The legal test for self-defence– drawn from the 19th-century Caroline doctrine and later jurisprudence – demands that the necessity of self-defense be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Continue reading “THE ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAN: When Law Collides with Survival — Part II: Sovereignty, Paralysis, the Future of International Law & the Confluence of Unpredictable Events”
Wow did I get an earful after my
Bending another state or institution (such as the International Criminal Court (ICC)) to the will of a more powerful sanctioning state may be distasteful, distressing, disadvantageous (depending on the side of the cause for the sanctions one is aligned with) but the harsh reality is that the use of sanctions is a sovereign prerogative. The sooner this reality is accepted and embraced, the sooner the sanctioned state or institution, along with their cast of supporting states, international and regional organizations, civil society, concerned global citizens can accept the need to explore realizable off-ramps or condition themselves to endure the consequences of the sanctions.
The last couple of weeks have been particularly disquieting for the International Criminal Court (ICC). Prime Minister of Hungary, Victor Orbán, not only