The Disciplinary Committee also notes that all of them [complainants] report after-effects resulting from Ms. Jennifer Naouri’s behavior and management style: diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (Exhibit PL138), anxiety attacks, loss of confidence, feelings of fear and intense stress, burnout, taking medication, even suicidal thoughts.
Disciplinary proceedings against Ms Jennifer Naouri, Decision, p.6.
This made me most angry. Young women come to the ICC with great enthusiasm and dreams, and what happens? They are psychologically mutilated, harassed, they are told that they cannot understand the dossier and cannot analyse all the dangers, so they can only obey.
Catherine Mabille, ICC Disciplinary Commissioner, quoted in Justice Info
Prolegomena
The ICC is yet again at a crossroad. This time the Registry faces a self-inflicted conundrum. The recent Disciplinary Board decision against Defence Counsel Jennifer Naouri exposed numerous systemic weaknesses known to the Registry for years. Sadly, the Registry has been listless and lazy. When it opts to act, it’s too little, too late. And even then, it embraces opaqueness and obfuscation. Query: will the Registry take the path that fosters a workplace free of abusive behavior inflicted on subordinate staff across all organs and independent actors in the court, or will it continue down the path of business as usual.
Harsh but well-earned criticism. The Registry has been too lax and too indisposed to bother with providing the necessary training, upholding high standards, affording adequate remuneration for qualified personnel, and monitoring the working conditions of the Defence. If there is an existing standard, it is one of marginal competence, marginal remuneration, marginal resources, marginal training, and marginal workplace oversight. Quality of representation, quality of competence, quality of skill level, quality of training, quality of the working environment has been of little concern to the Registry. Some have suggested that this is purposeful to give the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) a winning chance. Cynical as it sounds, subliminally, such intentions may be a factor when considering the OTP’s modest successes in the trial and appeal trenches.
Perhaps because it is the Defence why bother with quality when even less-than-adequate will be tolerated. Plenty of inexperienced, ill-equipped, ill(un)-trained lawyers and law graduates are eager to get into a case – even when they know or should know that they are unqualified and would not want anyone of their ilk representing them were they in their client’s shoes. I don’t blame them for wanting the experience, the privilege, the opportunity. After all, unlike some domestic bars,1 there is no disciplinary rule that requires Lead Counsel or Associate Counsel to take a pass on a case beyond his/her capabilities since the (erroneous) presumption is that being on the List of Counsel denotes having the skills, knowledge, experience required. I blame the Registry. If it is going to have marginal and sub-marginal standards, at least it should, at a minimum, provide the necessary training and oversight. And when things go awry, the Registry must act immediately and must also be exceptionally transparent and exceptionally forthcoming.
Take for instance the ICC Disciplinary Board’s (Board) Decision on Defence Counsel Jennifer Naouri (Decision), the trip wire for this two-part series. The public version was promptly issued in French on 11 April 2025. Not only has it yet to be translated into the other official language, English, but, more importantly, it has yet to be posted on the official ICC web page. The Decision’s existence came to my attention only after a great deal of hunting around for it. But then, were it not for Margherita Capacci’s excellent article Harassment at the ICC: A Defence Lawyer Heavy Sanctioned in Justice Info, I would not have learned of the proceedings or Decision.
As I was searching for and reaching out to find what I believe is a profoundly important decision on ethics, professional responsibilities, and disciplinary issues, and which must be the focal point for improving workplace conditions and in fostering vital training that has been missing for decades, I kept thinking: How can this be so?
The disciplinary matter may not have run its full course considering there is the appeal, but why is the Decision not available to the public, and more importantly, to those who are currently working on defence teams and to List Counsel in general. Are there no lessons for the Registry in the Board’s Naouri findings? Can the Registry not make systemic changes and adopt monitoring modalities and skills training that appear necessary from the Decision? In addition to handing Naouri an 18-month suspension from ICC practice, the Board made recommendations. They are sound. Indeed, they are neither novel nor imaginative. They are similar to what I have written about and what I have discussed for nearly two decades with those in the Registry that are entrusted with overseeing the various aspects of the Defence.
Why the lack of transparency? Why the absurdity of effectively hiding the decision. Does the Registry’s inaction not feed into explicable perceptions that it scandalously tries to keep the public in the dark in matters that places it in a bad light? As it turns out, there may be an argument for the Decision to be on the QT and very Hush-Hush, to borrow a phrase from the film L. A. Confidential. According to Article 16 of the Rules of Procedure of the Disciplinary Board and Appeals Board
Rules of Procedure of the Disciplinary Board:
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- The decision shall be public. It shall be reasoned and issued in writing.
- The decision shall be registered with the Secretariat of the Disciplinary Board and notified to counsel subject to the disciplinary procedure, to the Registrar and to the Commissioner.
- When the decision is final, it shall be published in the Official Journal of the Court and transmitted to the national authority.
- Decisions made by the Disciplinary Board following the hearing shall be subject to the conditions set out in articles 41 and 42 of the Code.
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Article 41 of the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel reads:
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- The decision shall be made public. It shall be reasoned and issued in writing.
- The decision shall be notified to counsel subject to the disciplinary procedure and to the Registrar.
- When the decision is final, it shall be published in the Official Journal of the Court and transmitted to the national authority.
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There you have it. Though it makes little if any sense to have a public hearing and not make public the decision. Any claims of confidentiality are invalidated – even if nothing is final until it is final, even if the findings could change on appeal. Perhaps there is too much transparency in holding a public disciplinary hearing. Better than the non-transparent disciplinary process applied to elected officials as can be seen from the ongoing proceedings related to Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC.
I can appreciate that allegations that prove to be untrue or legally insufficient can be crippling to one’s reputation and standing and career, and therefore discretion is essential. But it seems preposterous to have procedural disciplinary rules that publicly reveal the disciplinary proceedings but privately conceal the results for months, even years – until the appeal phase is completed. In the meantime are not the Board’s findings – even if subject to appellate review – informative and instructive? Why then the charade – even if unintended?
In this two-part series I will address the Naouri findings in a broad context. In this part, I will lay the groundwork as it relates to the Registry, pointing to some of the systemic problems that exist, while also sharing my thoughts on the complexities of leading a defence team in a mega-case. In the following part I will drill down on the Decision and will discuss the Board’s recommendations. I will use the Naouri findings as a springboard, to address the overarching question: why those responsible in the Registrar’s Office for overseeing the funding, hiring, and work of the Defence teams knew or should have known of the reported harassment claims (some of which are likely to have caused long-lasting damage), and why they / the Registry chose not to act. In answering this question, in part, it behooves me to ask further questions as to whether others in the hierarchy on those two defence teams (Gbagbo and Said) may also bear or share responsibility. I don’t presume to know the answers. Nor am I claiming that responsibility should be affixed to anyone in particular on the mere basis of the Naouri findings. But obvious questions abound.
Opening Salvo
It stretches credulity and defies logic for those in authority at the ICC to feign ignorance or surprise when inappropriate, degrading and harmful behavior within the institution is exposed. An acknowledged culture of systemic and endemic abuse suffered by subordinates at the whims, fancies, and cruelties of superiors has existed for some time at the ICC. These workplace abuses persist in part because the Registry passively allows them to happen, acting only if compelled to do so by formal complaints – and even discouraging complaints, in certain cases. So it seems.
Abuses in the workplace (sexual, psychological, physical) rarely can be completely eliminated in a large, multi-cultural, multi-dimensional organization such as the ICC. But considering its raison d’être, considering that issues of degrading abuses have come to light in the past, and considering the damage these revelations cause to its reputation, you would think the ICC would robustly act to nip unacceptable behavior at the bud.
Rocked by claims of sexual and psychological harassment and work-related abuse of cult-like intrigue and occurrence, the ICC has all but abdicated its authority to lecture on ethics and morality. As the permanent international criminal tribunal, the ICC supposedly stands above all other such courts (or so it wishes the international community to believe), breaking trail as the vanguard by setting the example, expressing best practices, and championing human rights. Puerile fantasy.
Punching well below its weight since established, the ICC is proving to be more bark than bite. Or, to use a Texas aphorism, more hat than cattle. Its remit may be complex and challenging, but after more than two decades the toddler years should long be over. And in any event, administratively, issues related to the working environment – such as zero tolerance of any kind of abuse – is not a matter of figuring out what are best practices and ethical behavior (for these are well-known and well-established in domestic and international courts), but of diligently monitoring and promptly reacting when circumstances demand. The ICC may have plausible reasons for its indistinct and unimpressive win-loss record, number of cases adjudicated, concrete achievements, reparations to victims, etc., but it has no excuse, no legitimate reason, and certainly should have no tolerance for an abusive and toxic workplace in its halls.
In 2020, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) commissioned an Independent Expert Review (IER) of the ICC and the Rome Statute system. In a prior post, I discussed the IER Report. I highlighted their disturbing findings on the ICC’s workplace environment, notably:
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- many accounts of bullying behaviour amounting to harassment in all Organs of the Court though particularly the OTP ,
- complaints that the culture of the Court’s workplace was adversarial and implicitly discriminatory against women, and
- a number of accounts of sexual harassment, notably uninvited and unwanted sexual advances from more senior male staff to their female subordinates. (IER, para. 209).
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Despite these findings, the working environment remains infused with a noxious stench of inattentiveness and indifference and ineptitude. This was recently underscored with the Board’s Decision on Naouri. Based on what is described in the Decision, the complaining witnesses/victims, accused Naouri of inflicting physiological, emotional, and professional (workplace) abuse on them – her subordinates. Other non-complaining witnesses also claimed being on the receiving end of Naouri’s abuses, while others saw nothing, or based on what they saw were less inclined to fault Naouri, even portraying her as the hapless victim.
Not being present when the testimony was taken, and not having access to the written statements, transcript, and other relevant material in the case file, places me at a disadvantage; I might overlook contextual nuances or form opinions bases on findings of fact by the Board which I might disagree with were I present during the four-day proceedings and privy to all the information available to them. Of course, there is the appeal. It may be underway (another mysteriously opaque process; nothing posted on the ICC web page), but not knowing whether an appeal was filed, and even if so, not having access to the appeal submissions, I am unable to offer any insight. What I can say, however, it that the summary of the witnesses’ testimony, the analysis of the evidence, and the factual finding in the Decision are clearly, logically, and cogently presented.
According to the Decision, Naouri was found to have severely traumatized her subordinates with cruel and degrading insults, and abusive and unwarranted working conditions in two different cases for a decade (2012-2022): in the Laurent Gbagbo case as Associate/Co-Counsel, and in Mahamat Said Abdel Kani case (“Said case”) as Lead Counsel. There were additional instances of abuse reported in 2024 and 2025 despite her being on notice of the disciplinary complaint filed against her in 2023. As framed by the complainants and referred to in the summons of December 23, 2024, among other things, the accusations against Naouri included in particular:
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- Micro-management deemed excessive and unreasonable;
- The deliberate isolation of defence team members from other team members and from the Court more generally;
- Repeated, inopportune yelling;
- Denigrating remarks;
- A workload considered manifestly disproportionate.
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The Board found as much. Luckily for Naouri, the Disciplinary Board found that its jurisdiction was limited to acts and conduct as of 2018 when she was promoted to Lead Counsel, although much of her abusive behavior and the psychological harm she inflicted on subordinate staff occurred when acting as second-in-command to Emmanuel Altit, her supervisor and Lead Counsel in the Gbagbo case
Virtually all of Naouri’s impugned acts were committed by her and / or suffered by the complainants on the ICC premises.
The Registry deserves the lion share of credit for the Naouri affair
We cannot get to the specifics in the Naouri affair without first focusing on the Registry. As I see it, the Registry deserves the lion’s share of blame for enabling the decade-long workforce abuses inflicted by Naouri on her subordinates. Rhetorically I ask in the title whether the ICC/Registry tolerates workplace harassment out of willful blindness, callous indifference, blissful incompetence or institutional protectiveness? Circumstances considering, all seem to be in play to some degree.
The Defence may be independent of the ICC institution, but it is not beyond its reach, control, oversight, and ethical constraints and policies. With few exceptions, the ICC finances the Defence teams. It determines who is qualified to be on the List of Counsel and other associated lists. It appoints the teams’ members. It provides office space and office resources to every team. It authorizes requests for investigative mission trips. It affords resources for expert witness requests. It appoints ad hoc counsel to review the work of the Defence when deemed necessary. It hears complaints, and it has its own disciplinary regime apart from counsels’ national bar association regime. It provides substantive research assistance through the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (OPCD). It also provides training as required by Art. 7(2) of the Code(see my posts here, here, here, and here on the need for the Registry to provide essential training). Even if an accused hires and finances his own legal team, counsel and staff are subject to the Code of Professional Conduct and other relevant regulations, including their applicable domestic Codes of Conduct and lawyer regulations. In short, the ICC cannot claim lack of responsibility or authority, cannot claim immunity or lack of jurisdiction, and certainly cannot claim ignorance and distance itself from unethical and inappropriate behavior by anyone on any Defence team in any case before it – especially when occurring on ICC premises and ICC sanctioned (and financed) missions.
The Defence may not be an organ of the ICC, but when considering the location and physical proximity of Defence teams to where the Registrar and the Counsel Support Section (“CSS”) are located, that most of the work is performed at the ICC premises, and that the majority (if not all of the cases currently) are court-financed, it is beyond cavil that the ICC is just as responsible for the workplace environment of the Defence as it is for the rest of the ICC staff. Hence the legitimacy of the disciplinary regime, the work of the Commissioner, and the findings of the Disciplinary Board (subject to appeal, as any proper disciplinary regime would provide).
As so I ask, how is it that in this close-quartered, closely knit environment Naouri was able (permitted) to seriously abuse countless staff members for over a decade in two cases under the very noses of those responsible within the Registrar’s Office? How is it possible that the Registry countenanced a culture of abuse that so shocked the conscience of the prosecuting representative of the ICC in this disciplinary matter, Commissioner Catherine Mabille (an exceptionally experienced Defence counsel with rich international experience of impeccable integrity) that it caused her to remark:
“Such a case file has never been seen, for the number of victims and the lengthfe and importance of the evidence, we had 6,000 pages.”
The brutal, unvarnished, inconvenient truth is the dirty little secret often muttered in the corridors of the august ICC premises, that Naouri, like some others that find themselves out of serendipity and not due to experience and skill in a position of leading a Defence team, was way over her head when she first started as the second in command in the Gbagbo case.
The Registry has known for years – and I have heard firsthand grumblings from within by those that there are far too many young inexperienced lawyers and law graduates who may have impressive graduate law degrees but have next to nothing in relevant experience to be in positions of authority on Defence teams. No sense in naming names; they will only deny that they were aware of any such issues. But even were they to acknowledge that they knew or suspected what I am asserting as known facts by those most responsible for overseeing the work of the Defence, including the financial needs to which hiring options are invariably linked, the trite and deceptive and expedient go to mantra is that under international law the accused is entitled to select his Defence team. Yes, but not so fast.
The right to have counsel of choice is not an unqualified entitlement – especially when the Defence is financed by the tribunal or court. The Registry, in particular the Division of Judicial Services and the CSS, have oversight authority. It is just as nonsensical of the Registry to claim incapacity to ensure that the leading and most responsible members of a Defence team are qualified and are carrying out their functions in a professional, ethical, and client-centered fashion, as it would be for the presiding judge along with other members of a chamber to abdicate their role in ensuring that the suspect’s or accused’s fair trial rights are being afforded, among other means, through competent representation.
It is not for either the Registry or Chambers to second guess the theory, strategy, and tactics of the Defence teams. But when even a blind person can see that the suspect or accused is being short-changed of his guaranteed rights because of the choice he/she made in selecting counsel and agreeing to counsel’s selection of co-counsel, neither Registry nor Chambers should idly stand by. When the Registry hears and sees that the staff on a Defence team are being abused (re Naouri I was hearing disturbing things as early as 2015-16 and onwards), it must intervene immediately. Even rumors of unprofessional and unethical behavior should be investigated promptly.
So, why in this instance (and there may be others) did the Registry not act with alacrity but rather waited to react (having no choice) to the complaint of 2023? The answers are simple: why rock the boat? Why replace counsel or disrupt the inner-workings of a Defence team that on surface is seemingly doing a yeomen’s service? Why cause inconvenience – however necessary and reasonable – to the Registry, the Chamber, the suspect or accused? Why draw attention to a disquieting situation that will likely expose the ICC to unwanted negative publicity? Rumors occasionally prove true; being pro-active is better than being in-active.
The Registry’s instinctive inaction and laissez-faire attitude toward acting when it should, has nothing to do (or at least it shouldn’t) with saving resources or time. Any added financial resources needed or delays to the proceedings are inconsequential when considering the modest allocation of funds to Defence teams (and pittance paid to Counsel and all the way down the line) and the lumbering pace of proceedings. It is about not wanting to confront messy inconvenient truths. Much like the Catholic church in not dealing with the sexual abuses committed by their priest on the innocent and vulnerable faithful, pretending that the problem does not exist and circling the wagons for the protection of the institution is less painful and taxing. Silence and inaction require no introspection, no acknowledgment of responsibility, no efforts to air systemic problems or to search for sustainable solutions.
I don’t presume to know the conditions in the Gbagbo case when Naouri worked under Altit. Nor do I know of the conditions in the Said case in which she is Lead Counsel. But with nearly 25 years of experience at various international(ized) criminal tribunals and courts (on top of some 20 years of domestic practice), I think I know a thing or two on the challenges of running a Defence team in mega-cases – especially when the allocated resources and the talent-pool from which to select experienced staff are modest. With limited resources come limited experience. Enthusiasm may be in abundance, but unless the resources are sufficient to recruit highly experienced case managers and legal assistants and investigators, then what is required are experienced counsel and co-counsel (aka at the ICC as Assistant Counsel) that know how to train and organize and manage and perform.
For a better understanding of the general work of the defence, leading a team, and the requisite experience and skills and training and ethical awareness required, let me share my views on some practical contextual consideration s. This may be useful in appreciating the Naouri findings and the Board’s recommendations to the Registry discussed in Part 2 of this series.
Practical Contextual Considerations
I have observed well-staffed Defence teams at the ICC operating with an appreciable degree of dysfunctionality teetering on chaos. For this, I fault Lead Counsel, even when the day-to-day managing has been delegated. Having a large, well-staffed team, can be dysfunctional and ineffective if the captain at the helm of the ship is ill-equipped, ill-trained, or ill-suited to the task. I’ve heard disquieting instances where Lead Counsel expects the team to assist in the middle of night in drafting major submissions or in preparing Lead Counsel for cross-examination because he/she did not know how to manage his/her time, spent needless hours holding the clients hand at the detention unit in lieu of working on pressing matters, or had the staff meandering on irrelevant or inconsequential matters, or not knowing how to prioritize, and so on.
Here, the staff is not to blame any more than the Registry (often criticized for insufficiently funding Defence teams). Here I blame Lead Counsel for needlessly creating drama, stress, and crises. They overwork and exhaust the staff needlessly. And just as they don’t know how to avoid getting into a crisis (organization, pre-planning, forward-thinking, proper time and resource management, avoidance of acting on the eve of deadlines for no reason other than habit and indifference to the staff’s physical and mental health, etc), they don’t know how to manage and get out of a crisis – other than to take it out on the staff, scapegoating, and dog-whistling.
No case can be tried without eventually facing some sort of crisis, however well-prepared and well-experienced counsel and the Defence team may be. But there are ways to manage without abusing the staff. As a primer on dealing with crises, I recommend Conquering Crisis: Ten Lessons to Learn Before You Need Them by retired United States Navy four star admiral William H. McRaven. In his words:
Leadership during a crisis is fundamentally different from running an organization day to day. … That is not to say that the basics of leadership aren’t important during an emergency–they are. As a strong leader, during a crisis you must continue to be ethical, work hard, be confident, communicate with the workforce, and have a plan to address the problem. But a crisis brings an added layer of difficulty. A crisis pushes the limits of your experience. It challenges your confidence. It strains your team’s morale and stretches your organizational resources. It entices you to make decisions before you’re ready. It forces you to take risks, and it exposes every flaw in your personality and your organizational culture. To effectively lead through a crisis, you need additional tools. (pp. XIV-XV)
No one case is similar to another. However, approaches to preparing a case and trying it, to selecting staff and training it, to adopting protocols for quality control and due diligence, are the same. Adjusting these approaches based on the peculiarities of the case and the available staff and resources requires experience, foresight, flexibility, attentiveness, consultation (brainstorming with the staff), experimentation, self-awareness, and humility.
As leader of the team responsible for everyone’s work-product and conduct, Lead Counsel is expected to know every facet of every position on the team or at least recognize what he/she doesn’t know and have the good sense to hire those who do know – and listen to them. Improvisation is often required, but it only works if you know what you are doing and what has to be done.
A talented jazz musician can improvise effortlessly and intuitively not because of genius (although the likes of Charlie Parker, Miles Davis, John Coltrane, Bill Evans, Chick Corea, to name a few, were geniuses), but because they have a solid foundation on the basics, have well-developed skills, are versatile, are supreme listeners, are agile, and have a wealth of experience from which to intuitively draw from. And because they practiced their major, minor and modal scales and arpeggios, etc. for 30, 40, 50, or 70+ years (for an inspirational read that validates this point, see The Notebooks of Sonny Rollins).
Improvising is not about randomly and aimlessly reacting hoping something might work. It is about being nimble, being in the moment and making calculated decisions with confidence but also with self-awareness of the risks. And when mistaken approaches are taken – an inevitability however experienced and diligent Lead Counsel may be given the organic nature of preparing and trying cases for trial – Lead Counsel owns those mistakes. He/she cannot accuse or blame or scapegoat others, and should by all means avoid projecting by inflicting insults and abuse on subordinates.
Working with a team with diverse backgrounds and experiences and skills and information-processing habits is difficult. Presumably the team has been carefully selected. But there is no guarantee that individually and as part of the team they will work out as hoped when hired. The key is to hire the best and the brightest, the most enthusiastic and most experienced. But that is not always possible. Many come with graduate degrees but without a clue on how to write a simple submission – or how to work with others on a team project. Some think they are good writers (and probably are for an academic paper for a class) but in reality have little to no experience in writing legal submissions, crafting cogent arguments, can’t separate the forest from the trees, have no strategic or tactical thinking skills, and most assuredly, have no real world trial advocacy skills or rigorous practical training.
Yet, these same law school graduates (few actually with a bar license to practice) are keen to be part of a Defence team, keen to lean the added skills they lack, keen to be meaningfully contribute. Those fortunate enough to get on a Defence case will not be compensated very well. They will end up working long hours, often late into the night and during weekends and holidays. They will make personal sacrifices not required of their counterparts working for the prosecution or registry. For the most part, they will make these personal sacrifices with little to no fuss when the esprit de corps is high, in time of need, when there is mutual respect, and when the staff know that circumstances demanding their extra hours or forgoing their weekend plans are not due to counsel’s (or second-in-command’s) inability or insensitivity in managing time or his/her disorganized and apathetic approach in dealing with matters requiring diligent foresight and preparation.
Most of the young, idealistic, and passionate law graduates I have had the privilege of working with as part of my Defence teams have been hardworking, loyal, even protective. What they all have in common is the desire to learn, to get skills, to be given substantive work, and to grow. They want to be mentored, and they want to be acknowledged. It is not always smooth sailing. Staff occasionally make mistakes. Sometimes they underdeliver having oversold themselves. Sometimes they drop the ball out of carelessness. Sometimes they are not as quick in picking up things and will require a bit more time and effort and patience and instruction. As for the occasional slackers, the wannabes who are unwilling to commit the time and energy to get with the program, to assist mates on the team, they tend to wash out early on and without much drama – in part because of peer pressure.
When members of a Defence team are properly selected, trained and instructed, major mistakes rarely occur. But mistakes will occur. They are just as unavoidable by the staff as they are by Lead Counsel or second-in-command. Intellectually honest and competent leaders acknowledge their errors, while being understanding and empathetic when subordinates err. Rather than browbeating and intimidating and insulting subordinates on their errors, Lead Counsel should calmly explain what the problem is and offer concrete advice and instructions on how to improve. Pesky little mistakes associated with inattentiveness, sloppiness, or fatigue, can be frustratingly irritating. Under pressure it is hard to always keep cool and easy to overreact (Oh, I’ve been there). Styles on handling pressure and managing a team during stressful situations vary. But one thing is certain: if the team is paralyzed because of fear of making a mistake or displeasing their supervisor or because they have had their confidence stripped and dignity assaulted and their intelligence questioned, then things get worse leading to more recrimination, more paralysis, more errors.
If a team member, despite proper mentoring and training, cannot meet the requisite demands – assuming they are reasonable and necessary and intrinsic to the position – the best thing to do is to have a frank conversation as to why a parting of the ways is in the best interest of all. The client is the one most impacted by an ineffective or discordant or malfunctioning Defence team.
In short, leading a Defence team requires a competent, diligent, experienced, confident, and empathic Lead Counsel (or whoever is placed in command, normally Associate/Co-Counsel). It is not enough to have the basic technical skills to ask a leading question during cross-examination or knowing not to ask leading questions during direct examination, or how and why a written submission should be crafted, or for that matter being well-versed in the statutory provisions, rules of evidence and procedure, and jurisprudence. This may be enough for a legal assistant, but not for an Associate/Co-counsel and certainly not for Lead Counsel. Herein lies the rub.
To Be Continued.
About Author
- e.g. The American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1, which provides: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” [↩]
