Occasionally, I get facts wrong. When that happens, I have no difficulty acknowledging error.
In my earlier post, relying on the biographical details listed by Temple Garden Chambers, I stated that Judge Abdul Koroma was no longer serving as a judge of the International Court of Justice. As Professor Heller was quick – and no doubt delighted – to point out, Judge Koroma presently sits at the ICJ in an ad hoc judicial capacity.
On that point, I was, like Middle East Eye in breaking the story, mistaken. Mea culpa. And sincerely so.
I therefore readily acknowledge the error and apologize to Judge Koroma. I also thank Professor Heller for the correction, although I confess the clarification does not quite produce the exculpatory effect he may have hoped for.
If anything, the correction improves the optics of this affair about as much as gasoline improves a kitchen fire.
So, no retraction.
Indeed, learning that Judge Koroma currently sits in an ad hoc judicial capacity at the ICJ makes the entire affair substantially more troubling from an institutional standpoint.
We are no longer discussing a retired jurist informally sharing personal reflections over tea and biscuits. We are now confronted with a currently serving ad hoc ICJ judge issuing a strategically timed “opinion” concerning ongoing disciplinary proceedings involving the Prosecutor of an entirely separate international court – an “opinion” that reportedly warns of reputational catastrophe, procedural illegality, reinstatement, reversal, and substantial financial liability should the proceedings continue.
That is extraordinary.
And it inevitably raises even more uncomfortable questions.
Was this “opinion” intended merely as private legal commentary? Or was it designed – subtly or otherwise – to borrow the aura of something approaching an ex cathedra judicial pronouncement? Was it meant to carry the institutional gravitas of the bench itself, despite being directed toward the Bureau of a wholly separate institution?
Was the “opinion” presented on judicial stationery or otherwise clothed in the visual trappings of judicial authority? Was Judge Koroma compensated for his work and time, and if so, by whom and how much? What precisely did he review? Were confidential materials involved? If so, how were they obtained and transmitted? And was it appropriate for a currently serving judge – even in an ad hoc capacity – to review confidential material connected to active disciplinary proceedings elsewhere?
These questions remain unanswered. They remain entirely legitimate.
To be fair, there is another possibility that cannot presently be excluded based on the publicly available information.
It is entirely possible that Judge Koroma was formally approached or commissioned by the Bureau to provide an external legal assessment. If so, several of the questions raised above would become considerably less mysterious. Access to confidential material, provision of supporting documentation, logistical or research assistance, and even compensation for professional services would potentially fall within an ordinary institutional framework.
If so, fairness requires acknowledging that possibility. But even that scenario leaves several central concerns unresolved.
Most obviously: how and why did the “opinion” reach the hands of the Middle East Eye at this politically sensitive moment? Who leaked it? For what purpose? And why was the public narrative built around selectively reported conclusions rather than the release of the full document?
Moreover, even assuming formal commissioning by the Bureau, the quality and certainty of the legal analysis reportedly advanced would remain open to scrutiny. Having reviewed the relevant framework myself, I do not find the jurisdictional and procedural questions surrounding ILOAT as categorical or settled as the reporting on the “Koroma Opinion” suggests. The legal landscape is considerably more contested, nuanced, and unresolved than the public presentation implies.
In other words, formal provenance may resolve certain procedural questions, but it does not necessarily resolve the substantive ones. Nor does it explain the timing, choreography, and strategic deployment of the leak itself. It also fails to explain how someone with the Temple Garden Chambers connections to Karim Khan and his wife survived vetting to such a task.
Indeed, the more one examines this affair, the more difficult it becomes to accept the fiction that this was merely a detached, spontaneous act of civic-minded legal reflection by an octogenarian ad hoc ICJ judge who independently decided to immerse himself in ILOAT jurisprudence and issue a conveniently timed “opinion” on his own initiative.
At a certain point, coincidence begins to exhaust itself as an explanation. Particularly when the “opinion” somehow finds its way – at precisely the right political moment – into the hands of the Middle East Eye, an outlet that has repeatedly emerged as a remarkably well-positioned recipient of leaks, narrative framing, and strategically advantageous developments favorable to Khan throughout this entire affair.
One need not be a conspiracy theorist to recognize choreography when it is evident. Nor does one need a crystal ball to recognize that the invocation of catastrophic financial consequences – framed less as possibility than near inevitability – may itself serve a strategic purpose: namely, creating institutional pressure for either reinstatement or a negotiated exit package while simultaneously reinforcing a public narrative of “exoneration.”
After all, if a substantial settlement eventually materializes, it would almost certainly be publicly framed as vindication. Perhaps that would be entirely coincidental. But I confess that I no longer find coincidence doing much analytical heavy lifting here.
While I readily and sincerely correct my earlier factual error regarding Judge Koroma’s current status, I stand by virtually all of the broader concerns and questions previously raised – subject, of course, to the possibility that this was an officially commissioned assessment by the Bureau. That possibility would clarify certain aspects of provenance, though it would still leave the more troubling questions concerning timing, selective circulation, and strategic deployment untouched.
Now that I know the “opinion” comes from a currently serving ad hoc ICJ judge rather than a fully retired former judge, I find the issuance, timing, framing, and strategic deployment of the document not less troubling but considerably more so.
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