{"id":5938,"date":"2026-04-20T03:02:01","date_gmt":"2026-04-20T01:02:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/michaelgkarnavas.net\/blog\/?p=5938"},"modified":"2026-04-20T05:18:01","modified_gmt":"2026-04-20T03:18:01","slug":"when-power-protects-itself-a-test-of-moral-authority","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/michaelgkarnavas.net\/blog\/2026\/04\/20\/when-power-protects-itself-a-test-of-moral-authority\/","title":{"rendered":"WHEN POWER PROTECTS ITSELF: Sexual Misconduct Allegations, Institutional Influence, and the ICC\u2019s Hardest Test"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/div><\/p>\n

It\u2019s not just the abuse of power that\u2019s the problem. It\u2019s the power to abuse.<\/p>
\n

\u2013Stefan Molyneux<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote><\/p>\n

When an Institution Must Judge Itself<\/strong><\/p>\n

Institutions created to judge power are often least prepared to confront it when it resides within their own walls.<\/p>\n

That is the paradox now confronting the International Criminal Court (ICC). An institution established to challenge impunity abroad is now forced to confront a more uncomfortable possibility at home: whether power, once lodged within the institution, can begin to shape the terms of accountability from within<\/em>. At moments like this, the central question is no longer only whether misconduct occurred. It is whether an institution founded on law can preserve confidence in its own processes when authority itself becomes part of the equation.<\/p>\n

At international institutions, power rarely disappears when allegations of sexual misconduct arise. More often, it simply changes form.<\/p>\n

A senior official accused of sexual misconduct does not enter the disciplinary process as an ordinary respondent. He enters with the authority of office, the presumption of institutional credibility, and a network of relationships cultivated over years at the highest levels of professional and diplomatic life. The complainant \u2013 often a junior staff member \u2013 enters the same process without any of those advantages.<\/p>\n

That asymmetry does not prove guilt. But it can profoundly shape whether allegations are ever assessed on equal terms. Power does not always silence the truth. More often, it makes the truth harder to hear. It can make the process itself harder to trust and any eventual outcome harder to regard as legitimate.<\/p>\n

Power Does Not Leave the Room<\/strong><\/p>\n

Power and politics are inseparable. When senior careers and institutional reputations are at stake because of allegations of serious workplace sexual misconduct, access to influence \u2013 whether inside or outside the organization \u2013 can shape not only narratives but also outcomes. The complainant, lacking prestige, status, and the protection of a well-positioned network, can become a bystander in her own case: watching influence operate beyond the procedural record, watching alliances quietly mobilize, and watching power attempt to define the terrain on which accountability is supposed to stand.<\/p>\n

The ICC now confronts precisely that dilemma.<\/p>\n

The issue is not simply whether one individual engaged in misconduct. The larger question is whether an institution founded on law can credibly investigate \u2013 and, if necessary, discipline \u2013 one of its most senior officials, ICC Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan, when the architecture of international diplomacy may already begin to tilt the process before the evidence has even been fully tested \u2013 indeed, before the disciplinary proceedings have meaningfully begun.<\/p>\n

Sexual misconduct allegations involving senior officials are inherently difficult to adjudicate. They often occur in private. There are rarely witnesses. There is seldom a recording, a contemporaneous document, or any single piece of evidence that can conclusively resolve what happened behind closed doors. In such cases, credibility inevitably becomes central.<\/p>\n

But credibility within institutions is never neutral. A junior employee may have only her account. A senior official may have decades of institutional relationships, personal loyalties, diplomatic goodwill, and access to powerbrokers who can quietly shape how others interpret the same facts.<\/p>\n

The Politics of Election<\/strong><\/p>\n

When the office itself is obtained through election, that imbalance becomes even more pronounced. Becoming ICC Prosecutor is not secured by merit alone. It is shaped by diplomatic campaigns, political bargaining, regional alignments, reciprocal understandings, and the careful cultivation of support among States Parties.<\/p>\n

In Khan\u2019s case, his prior representation before the ICC of a senior political figure who later became the sitting head of a State Party \u2013 one with longstanding regional relationships, access to influential political networks, and direct ties to other heads of state within the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) \u2013 also became part of the political currency that helped advance his candidacy. There was nothing inherently improper about that. Rather, it was the familiar grammar of international power politics.<\/p>\n

And once elected, those networks do not disappear.<\/p>\n

Alongside a high-ranking office-holder stands an informal constellation of allies \u2013 former colleagues, diplomatic patrons, political supporters, and institutional loyalists \u2013 who move easily through embassies, receptions, and private channels of influence, quietly reinforcing reputations and shaping perceptions long after the ballots are counted.<\/p>\n

That structural imbalance is troubling enough on its own. In many respects, it is embedded in the institutional reality of international organizations and may never be fully eliminated. It is part of the ecosystem in which international justice operates.<\/p>\n

When Informal Influence Enters a Formal Process<\/strong><\/p>\n

What appears more troubling in this instance are reports \u2013 credible enough to warrant serious attention, even if not yet independently verified \u2013 that diplomatic representatives of certain States Parties have been privately approached by individuals seeking to influence how the disciplinary proceedings are understood: how the expert panel\u2019s review of the evidence should be interpreted, whether the allegations should be viewed as unproven, exaggerated, or politically motivated, and ultimately what conclusions others should draw before the process has even begun, let alone reached its natural end.<\/p>\n

\"It<\/p>\n

More troubling still are reports that Khan himself has engaged in direct conversations with heads of State Parties, despite having formally stepped aside from his duties. These private t\u00eate-\u00e0-t\u00eate discussions, if accurate, can only appear aimed not merely at explaining his position but at shaping the institutional atmosphere in which the disciplinary proceedings will occur and his future with the ICC will ultimately be decided.<\/p>\n

That distinction matters.<\/p>\n

Once the subject of an internal disciplinary process begins privately engaging the very political actors whose governments constitute the ASP responsible for institutional oversight, the line between defending oneself and quietly managing the process becomes blurred.<\/p>\n

Of course, Khan\u2019s account is diametrically opposed to the complainant\u2019s. That is hardly unusual. But in any credibility contest of this kind, preserving one version as the truth often requires portraying the other side not merely as mistaken but as dishonest \u2013 as the liar, the opportunist, or the instrument of some larger agenda.<\/p>\n

And once that framing begins to take hold, the process itself shifts.<\/p>\n

The concern is not limited to overt interference in the formal legal sense. It also includes a more familiar phenomenon within international institutions: discreet outreach, reputational advocacy, and private persuasion intended to shape how allegations are perceived before the formal process concludes.<\/p>\n

That influence, moreover, need not operate only in private.<\/p>\n

When Influence Moves Into Public View<\/strong><\/p>\n

A related point also deserves mention. Beyond any private outreach to States Parties, the parallel use of the media to shape perceptions of the proceedings raises its own concerns. Public statements attributed to Khan\u2019s legal team \u2013 particularly characterizations of the panel\u2019s findings as amounting to an \u201cexoneration\u201d or assertions that there is \u201cno credible evidence\u201d to support the allegations \u2013 have already begun circulating in parts of the press, including outlets willing to repeat those claims with little regard for procedural context. Whether deliberate or not, that kind of selective public framing risks turning a confidential disciplinary matter into a form of parallel litigation in the court of public opinion.<\/p>\n

The concern is not entirely novel at the ICC. Former Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo was criticized during his tenure for appearing to litigate aspects of a case through the press, a practice that drew criticism precisely because public advocacy can blur the line between legal process and narrative management (see<\/em> here)<\/a>. The present circumstances are obviously different; these are internal disciplinary proceedings rather than criminal prosecutions. But the underlying institutional concern is not altogether different. Once public messaging begins to shape how an unresolved matter is understood before the evidence has been fully examined, the integrity of the process comes under strain.<\/p>\n

That matters because public advocacy of this kind can serve more than one purpose. It can consolidate support, shape institutional sentiment, and, perhaps most significantly, establish a narrative in advance: that any adverse finding is not the product of an independent process but of a compromised one. In that sense, media engagement can become more than reputational defence. It can begin to resemble an effort to pre-emptively discredit the proceedings’ legitimacy.<\/p>\n

To be clear, this is not a criminal trial, and disciplinary proceedings do not carry the same formal restrictions that govern public commentary in adversarial litigation. But the underlying principle is not entirely different. Internal proceedings require the same basic protection against efforts to influence outcomes through channels outside the evidentiary record. That concern becomes sharper when one side appears to have established relationships with sympathetic media outlets while the other has no comparable means of shaping the public narrative. In those circumstances, the imbalance is no longer confined to the institution. It begins to extend into the public sphere as well.<\/p>\n

Put more plainly: those with institutional influence may be attempting \u2013 quietly, informally, and with plausible deniability \u2013 to tilt the scales of the adjudicative process, one way or another.<\/p>\n

If such concerns are substantiated, the implications are serious.<\/p>\n

When Procedure Becomes Vulnerable<\/strong><\/p>\n

A disciplinary mechanism cannot command confidence if one party enters the process with access to channels of influence categorically unavailable to the other. In an adversarial legal proceeding, both parties are prohibited from engaging in ex parte<\/em> communications with the decision-maker to prevent even the appearance of unequal access.<\/p>\n

Disciplinary proceedings should not be held to a lower standard of ethical and procedural fairness merely because they are administrative rather than criminal.<\/p>\n

As matters stand, a complainant may reasonably believe she is participating in a process governed by neutral rules, while the respondent may simultaneously benefit from a parallel process shaped by access, relationships, persuasion, and power. This is where institutional asymmetry becomes more pernicious. It is no longer merely an imbalance between two individuals. It becomes a distortion of the process itself.<\/p>\n

Even the perception that the Prosecutor, on voluntary leave due to sexual assault allegations, is meeting privately with heads of state \u2013 despite having stepped aside and therefore having no obvious official reason to do so \u2013 erodes confidence in the fairness of the proceedings.<\/p>\n

For staff within the institution, the lesson may be unmistakable: formal procedures may exist on paper, but outcomes are likely to be shaped in private by those who know whom to call, whom to persuade, and which pressure points to press quietly. That lesson extends far beyond this case.<\/p>\n

Future complainants may conclude that unless they possess irrefutable evidence \u2013 rare in allegations of this kind \u2013 the personal cost of reporting misconduct may outweigh any realistic prospect of a fair hearing. Silence can begin to seem more rational than disclosure. Once that perception takes root within an institution, accountability becomes harder to sustain, regardless of what the written rules promise.<\/p>\n

That may be the most damaging consequence of all.<\/p>\n

When Conduct Around the Case Becomes Part of the Case<\/strong><\/p>\n

And there is a further point that deserves to be said plainly.<\/p>\n

Speaking as a defence counsel, one of the first instructions any lawyer should give a client facing allegations of serious misconduct is simple: do not attempt \u2013 personally or through others \u2013 to influence the outcome of the case outside the process.<\/p>\n

That caution is not grounded in ethics alone, although ethics plainly require it. It is also grounded in experience. Even an innocent person may fear a flawed process. The desire for reassurance that the right outcome will ultimately be reached is deeply human. Yet there remains an important distinction between anxiety about fairness and efforts to quietly shape the environment in which fairness is supposed to operate.<\/p>\n

That distinction can itself become relevant.<\/p>\n

Attempts to influence a proceeding through private channels do not prove the underlying allegations. They should never be mistaken for proof. But neither are they irrelevant. In some circumstances, they may support an inference that the accused is not entirely prepared to leave the matter to the evidence alone.<\/p>\n

That distinction becomes more difficult to ignore when considered alongside other reported facts. According to The Guardian<\/em>\u2019s reporting, which reviewed the panel\u2019s findings, Khan reportedly declined to say whether he had a sexual relationship with the complainant while simultaneously denying that any sexual contact was non-consensual. If true as reported, it is a bit Clintonian:<\/p>\n

It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is. If the\u2014if he\u2014if ‘is’ means is and never has been, that is not\u2014that is one thing. If it means there is none, that was a completely true statement. \u2026 Now, if someone had asked me on that day, are you having any kind of sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky, that is, asked me a question in the present tense, I would have said no. And it would have been completely true.<\/em><\/p>\n

Standing alone, Khan\u2019s answer may seem a narrow distinction. Yet in context \u2013 particularly if there were parallel efforts to shape how those same allegations were being privately understood by States Parties \u2013 it becomes harder to dismiss as incidental. That is why certain questions cannot simply remain unasked \u2013 under oath.<\/p>\n

They go not merely to the allegations themselves, but to the integrity of the proceedings:<\/p>\n