{"id":1993,"date":"2017-02-20T16:17:15","date_gmt":"2017-02-20T15:17:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/michaelgkarnavas.net\/blog\/?p=1993"},"modified":"2017-02-22T16:55:30","modified_gmt":"2017-02-22T15:55:30","slug":"myanmars-disproportionate-security-response","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/michaelgkarnavas.net\/blog\/2017\/02\/20\/myanmars-disproportionate-security-response\/","title":{"rendered":"Myanmar\u2019s disproportionate security response to the Muslim insurgency in the northern Rakhine State & its indiscriminate attacks against the Rohingyas: a perfect storm for a mass atrocity"},"content":{"rendered":"

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A heavy-handed security response that fails to respect fundamental principles of proportionality and distinction is not only in violation of international norms; it is also deeply counterproductive. It will likely create further despair and animosity, increasing support for HaY [Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement)] and further entrenching violence. International experience strongly suggests that an aggressive military response, particularly if not embedded in a broader policy framework, will be ineffective against the armed group and has the potential to considerably aggravate matters.<\/p>
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International Crisis Group Report, Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State<\/a><\/em>, 15 December 2016<\/span>((International Crisis Group, Asia Report N\u00b0283, Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State<\/em><\/a>, 15 December 2016, Executive Summary, p. ii (\u201cICG Report\u201d). ))<\/p><\/blockquote><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>I have previously intimated that the Myanmar government may be flirting with acts of genocide<\/a> by being involved in or turning a blind eye to the human rights violations against the Rohingyas in the northern Rakhine State (\u201cnRS\u201d).\u00a0 Three weeks later, on 3 February 2017, the United Nations (\u201cUN\u201d) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (\u201cOHCHR\u201d) mission to Bangladesh issued a report<\/a> (\u201cOHCHR Report\u201d).\u00a0 Apropos.<\/p>\n

Though I do not consider myself a human rights advocate (international criminal defense lawyers are hardly viewed as humanitarians), I was prompted by the OHCHR Report to do a bit more digging. Recognizing the challenges involved in appreciating the complexities of the situation in Myanmar, the historical context of the Rohingyas in the nRS, and the ongoing events as they are unfolding (it is hard to get complete and accurate information), I will nonetheless attempt to offer an assessment of what I believe is the making of a perfect storm for a mass atrocity.<\/p>\n

In this post, I will focus on recent events which have been widely reported in the press and by other organizations.\u00a0 Most notably, I will draw from the International Crisis Group (\u201cICG\u201d), whose report Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State<\/em><\/a> is essential contextual reading for the OHCHR\u2019s report Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016<\/em><\/a>.<\/em>(( Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh, Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016<\/em><\/a>, 3 February 2017 (\u201cOHCHR Report\u201d). )) My conclusion is that crimes against humanity are occurring against the Rohingyas with virtual impunity. While the Myanmar government has every right to strike against Muslim insurgents in the nRS (an insurgency that, it appears, is the making of its own discriminatory practices against the Rohingyas), it cannot claim with any degree of plausibility that the attacks against the Rohingyas are impulsive, indiscriminate, irrepressible, or inexplicable. The facts as reported cast a shadow of complicity; not of mere indifference, and certainly not of powerlessness.<\/p>\n

I will follow this post with a brief review of Azeem Ibrahim\u2019s The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar\u2019s Hidden Genocide<\/em><\/a>.<\/em>(( Azeem Ibrahim, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar\u2019s Hidden Genocide (Hurst 2016) (\u201cThe Rohingyas:<\/em> Inside Myanmar\u2019s Hidden Genocide<\/em>\u201d). )) It is timely, thought-provoking, and relevant to the events that have been unfolding in the nRS, especially since October 2016.<\/p>\n

Recently published, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar\u2019s Hidden Genocide<\/em> offers historical insight on the Rohingyas in Rakhine, or Arakan, as it was previously known. Ibrahim argues, rather persuasively, that the Rohingyas are not modern Bengali who migrated to Myanmar in the past few decades (as the current narrative goes among some Buddhist Burmans), but rather, have been residing in Arakan since about the 9th century.<\/p>\n

Ibrahim advances compelling arguments on the culpability of the military, the political elite, and the Buddhist religious establishment for the Rohingyas\u2019 current predicament, warning that \u201cMyanmar stands on the edge of genocide and that the persecutions of the Rohingyas has been quite deliberately constructed by the state since the early 1960s.\u201d((Id.<\/em>, at 139.)) Perhaps.<\/p>\n

Ibrahim is on more solid footing when addressing the historical origins of the Rohingyas than when attempting to ascribe concerted deliberateness or venturing into legal issues such as \u201cgenocide in international law.\u201d Notwithstanding its shortcomings, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar\u2019s Hidden Genocide<\/em> is a worthy read for anyone wishing to enrich his or her understanding of the events in the nRS and the plight of the Rohingyas.<\/p>\n

The Harakah al-Yaqin Muslim insurgency of October 2016 \u2013 cause and consequence<\/em> <\/strong><\/p>\n

On 9 October 2016, the Harakah al-Yaqin \/ Faith Movement (\u201cHaY\u201d), a Muslim insurgent group well versed in guerrilla war tactics, led by Rohingya \u00e9migr\u00e9s in Saudi Arabia and commanded by Rohingyas in the nRS, waged a deadly attack against the Border Guard Police in the nRS.(( ICG Report, p. 12.)) The attack escalated on 12 November 2016, with a senior army officer being killed.<\/p>\n

The HaY\u2019s legitimacy is \u201cprovided by local and international fatwas<\/em> (religious judicial opinions) in support of its cause and enjoys considerable sympathy and backing from Muslims in northern Rakhine State, including several hundred locally trained recruits.\u201d(( Id<\/em>., p. 13.)) To this extent, the ICG poignantly notes:<\/p>\n

The government faces a huge challenge in calibrating and integrating its political, policy and security responses to ensure that violence does not escalate and intercommunal tensions are kept under control. It requires also taking due account of the grievances and fears of Rakhine Buddhists.(( Id<\/em>., p. 21.))<\/p>\n

A tall order, considering Myanmar\u2019s government has for all intents and purposes been complicit in denigrating, discriminating against, and, as of 2015, disenfranchising the Rohingyas.(( OHCHR Report, pp. 5-6; ICG Report, p. 5.)) Its past policies and contrived historical narratives have contributed to the perceived grievances and fears of Rakhine Buddhists.<\/p>\n

The insurgency was inevitable<\/p><\/blockquote><\/div>Reap what you sow. \u00a0The insurgency was inevitable.\u00a0 Discrimination and human rights violations against the Rohingya has been prevalent for years in the nRS.(( OHCHR Report, pp. 5-7; ICG Report, pp. 3-5.)) Disenfranchised by the Myanmar government, they are viewed as illegal interlopers, posing a threat to the state and to the state-sanctioned religion, Buddhism. The Rakhine Buddhist Burman would prefer nothing more than to have the nRS cleansed of these \u201cBengali\u201d immigrants: the Rohingyas should go back to where they came from, Bangladesh.<\/em>\u00a0 So has the narrative gone, and continues to go. \u00a0Thus, it should come as no surprise that:<\/p>\n

The Rohingya face severe restrictions on their freedom of movement. In nRS, they require official authorization to move between, and often within, townships (for example, a village departure certification is required to stay overnight in another village.) The procedures to secure travel are onerous and time-consuming, and failure to comply with requirements can result in arrest and prosecution. Restrictions routinely lead to extortion and harassment by law enforcement and public officials. Since the outbreak of violence in Rakhine in June 2012, a curfew was imposed in nRS, which offers broad discretionary powers to the authorities, including with regard to limitations on assembly and prohibiting movement between dusk and dawn.\u00a0 This curfew remains in place, having been extended in the wake of the 9 October events\u2026.(( OHCHR Report, p. 6, citing<\/em> Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Violations and Abuses against Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar<\/em>, A\/HRC\/32\/18, 29 June 2016, paras. 28-30 and Amnesty International Report, ASA 16\/5362\/2016, 20 December 2016.))<\/p>\n

It was only a matter of time before being on the receiving end (with no end in sight) of prejudice and persecution would lead to violent reactions from some Rohingyas (and other Muslims) in the nRS.\u00a0 The ICG is spot on:<\/p>\n

Disenfranchisement prior to the 2015 elections severed the last link with politics and means of influence. At the same time, the disruption of maritime migration routes to Malaysia closed a vital escape valve, particularly for young men whose only tangible hope for the future was dashed. An increasing sense of despair has driven more people to consider a violent response, but it is not too late for the government to reverse the trend.(( ICG Report, Executive Summary, pp. i-ii.))<\/p>\n

Ibrahim (as of when his book went to press) claimed that there was \u201cno evidence\u201d to the \u201cregular motif in the extremist Buddhist narrative\u201d that there are \u201cclose links between the Rohingyas and states such as Saudi Arabia, or armed jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda or ISIS.\u201d(( The Rohingyas:<\/em> Inside Myanmar\u2019s Hidden Genocide<\/em>, p. 125.)) Considering the events of October and November 2016, and considering credible reports such as the one by the ICG, he may wish to reconsider this claim.<\/p>\n

It is not as if Ibrahim has not predicted the possibility that radical Islamic terrorism could find traction among the Rohingyas.\u00a0 He warns \u2013 presciently as it appears, unless the Myanmar government decides to reverse its current discriminatory policies (disenfranchisement included) against the Rohingyas \u2013 that the Rohingyas of the nRS and those having escaped or having been driven to neighboring countries are \u201cvulnerable to being targeted by a number of Islamic terrorist groups seeking to exploit any Muslim grievance, including Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), Jama\u2019atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).\u201d(( Id<\/em>., p. 126.)) Interestingly, Ibrahim observes that these terrorist groups build their deadly networks by calculatedly offering humanitarian assistance where states or international organizations refuse or fail to do so.(( Id<\/em>.))<\/p>\n

Deadly \u2013 rather than interesting \u2013 times are ahead for Myanmar\u2019s government, unless it changes course towards a more inclusive and more tolerant polity.<\/p>\n

Action begets overreaction <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Myanmar\u2019s government\u2019s response to the HaY insurgency of October and November 2016 was \u2013 at least by the OHCHR\u2019s account \u2013 disproportionate, replete with human rights violations, and arguably resulted in crimes against humanity.<\/p>\n

At the behest of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, an OHCHR four-member team conducted interviews of Rohingyas who had fled the nRS to Bangladesh. More than 220 persons were interviewed from 8 to 23 January 2017,(( OHCHR Report, p. 3.)) \u201cin addition to numerous representatives of UN system agencies, NGOs, health professionals and other experts in Dhaka and Cox\u2019s Bazar.\u201d(( Id<\/em>., p. 9.)) The OHCHR Report draws from various sources considered reliable (such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the ICG). Though the authors conducted no in situ<\/em> interviews, investigation, or collection of evidence (generally a significant weakness), they collected audio-visual material, photographs, and satellite imagery.\u00a0 Thus, even in the absence of a credible in situ <\/em>investigation, the OHCHR\u2019s conclusions seem reasonably well-sourced and certainly worth deliberating.<\/p>\n

Before I list the alleged crimes, it is worth looking at who was involved in the events in the nRS \u2013 other than the insurgents.\u00a0 Based on the testimonies of those interviewed, it appears that two main security forces were involved: the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw) and the Border Guard Police (\u201cBGP\u201d).(( Id<\/em>., p. 11.)) It was also reported that Rakhine villagers \u201cdressed in security-force uniforms, indicating that villagers [who] had recently been provided with such uniforms and weapons\u201d were involved.(( Id<\/em>., p. 12.)) And it was also reported that Rakhine villagers in civilian clothing were supporting the security forces, and \u201cwould engage in looting, beating, or sexual abuse on their own initiatives (but in the presence of security forces who did nothing to stop it).\u201d(( Id<\/em>., pp. 12-13.))<\/p>\n

By all accounts, the security forces and other armed elements operating in the nRS were de jure<\/em> or de facto <\/em>associated with or controlled by Myanmar\u2019s government or its armed forces. Their conduct during the events seemed coordinated, orchestrated, and tolerated.(( See <\/em>OHCHR Report, pp. 11-13; ICG Report, p. 6.)) Hard to imagine that the Tatmadaw and the BGP in Rakhine would be operating without the knowledge, acquiescence, and support of their superiors. And while the civilian authorities may have no control over the armed forces (as is the case both de jure<\/em> under the Constitution and de facto<\/em> in practice),(( Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, September 2008, Chapter I, Art. 20(b): \u201cThe Defence Services has the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces.\u201d Available<\/em> in English here<\/em><\/a> (unofficial translation). )) it also boggles the mind that the civilian leaders, including the Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, were left (and remain) in the dark \u2013 thus accounting for their pathetic response.<\/p>\n

alleged crimes are significant and troubling<\/p><\/blockquote><\/div>The alleged crimes are significant and troubling.\u00a0 Significant because of the nature and quantity of crimes in a relatively short period; troubling because the reaction thus far by the international community and the Myanmar government has been tepid. Here is a short summary of the listed crimes; you be the judge:<\/p>\n