{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"michaelgkarnavas.net\/Blog","provider_url":"https:\/\/michaelgkarnavas.net\/blog","title":"Making Sense of the Standard & Burden of Proof in Hybrid Courts: Reflections on the Common Law & Civil Law Approaches to Proof, Part III-B - Civil Law - michaelgkarnavas.net\/Blog","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"k1I1RN4Z40\"><a href=\"https:\/\/michaelgkarnavas.net\/blog\/2016\/06\/16\/civil-law-approaches-to-proof\/\">Making Sense of the Standard &#038; Burden of Proof in Hybrid Courts: Reflections on the Common Law &#038; Civil Law Approaches to Proof, Part III-B &#8211; Civil Law<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/michaelgkarnavas.net\/blog\/2016\/06\/16\/civil-law-approaches-to-proof\/embed\/#?secret=k1I1RN4Z40\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;Making Sense of the Standard &#038; Burden of Proof in Hybrid Courts: Reflections on the Common Law &#038; Civil Law Approaches to Proof, Part III-B &#8211; Civil Law&#8221; &#8212; michaelgkarnavas.net\/Blog\" data-secret=\"k1I1RN4Z40\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/michaelgkarnavas.net\/blog\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n<\/script>\n","description":"Part III-B \u2013 Civil Law Considering the outlined differences between continental and common law attitudes, there remains only one understanding of free proof that can safely be employed across Western legal systems. On this view, free proof rhetoric expresses the preference for a factfinding regime in which adjudicators are permitted to use ordinary processes of &hellip; Continue reading \"\"","thumbnail_url":"http:\/\/michaelgkarnavas.net\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/06\/Nicolaus-Beckmann-Jus-novissimum-romano-germanicum_MG_1057.tif-228x300.jpg"}