This is the third and final post in the series discussing the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2016). In this series, I focus on three preliminary examinations (the situations in Afghanistan and Ukraine, and the situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece, and Cambodia, or the Mavi Marmara incident) and discussed the political considerations involved.
In the first post I briefly discussed the procedure for preliminary examinations established by the Rome Statute and the attendant modalities adopted by the OTP. Before an investigation can begin, the OTP analyzes whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over a situation, and whether the situation is admissible. The OTP examines whether a national court is already dealing with the situation, how genuine are the investigations/trial (complementarity criteria), and whether there is enough information on crimes of sufficient gravity (gravity criteria). Regardless of jurisdiction and admissibility, the OTP will finally consider whether there is a compelling reason not to take on this situation (interests of justice).
In the second post I discussed the situations in Afghanistan and Ukraine. My take is that regardless of whether the states fail to cooperate with and follow up on the OTP’s investigations, the ICC can affect some positive results by nudging (naming and shaming if necessary) certain states into prosecuting in domestic courts cases that fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction. To this end, the ICC can play a role of an investigative organ of the international community – serving fully investigated cases on a silver platter for states to prosecute.
In this final post I will discuss the Mavi Marmara incident. Continue reading “The ICC-OTP’s Report on Preliminary Examination Activities: Part III – Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece, and Cambodia (the Mavi Marmara incident)”





