Rather than merely increasing the technocratic proficiencies of Cambodian legal professionals, the ECCC has instead modeled how to leverage such expertise to construct more convincing legal façades to provide cover for decision-making processes wholly determined by power and political interests. Importantly, key Cambodian lawyers and judges at the ECCC have done so by seizing on the ambiguous term “most responsible” in the Court’s constitutive documents, interpreting it in an inconsistent manner that conveniently conforms to the publicly stated views of the CPP, thereby borrowing a page from the CPP’s playbook of manipulating vague legal provisions. Not only has this produced incongruent outcomes in cases against similarly situated accused, but participating in the process has enhanced the capacity of relevant Cambodian legal actors who worked for the Court to more artfully engage in similar tactics domestically.
Randle C. DeFalco, Reassessing the Rule of Law Legacy of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 45 U. Pa. J. Int’l L 549, p. 560.
DeFalco’s conclusion is based on emotional reasoning masquerading for rational legal analysis. In failing to objectively assess the law, DeFalco displays a profound lack of appreciation of the basic tenets of the Rule of Law, including the principle of the presumption of innocence and the procedural system in place at the ECCC.
Michael G. Karnavas, A Response to Defalco’s: The Proper Interpretation of “Most Responsible” at the ECCC
Reading Randle C. DeFalco’s latest polemic on the legacy of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) – Reassessing the Rule of Law Legacy of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal – reminded me of Ronald Reagan’s famous quip “There you go again”. Reagan was responding to what he believed was a repeated misrepresentation of his position by President Jimmy Carter during a debate. Commenting on DeFalco’s 2014 article Cases 003 and 004 at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Definition of “Most Responsible” Individuals According to International Criminal Law, I found his analysis wanting and his conclusions the product of a result-oriented approach. Ten years later DeFalco is at it again.
In defining “most responsible” when working as a legal analyst at the Documentation Center of Cambodia – generally known as DC-Cam, originally a field office for Yale University’s Cambodian Genocide Program, established under the 1994 US Cambodian Genocide Justice Act to “collect relevant data on crimes of genocide committed in Cambodia” – DeFalco cherry-picked through relevant material in pre-determining that the suspects in Cases 003 and 004 were “most responsible” for crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. His aim was to influence the Co-Investigating Judges – who were still in the process of investigating – to indict the suspects. He had no access to the case files. Nor was he able to know the status of the investigations (or how the Co-Investigating Judges viewed the evidence before them or yet to be gathered). Yet, sanctimoniously, he nonetheless fixed on a position that brooked no allowances of differences in assessing the evidence based on his interpretation of the applicable law.
While the legal definition “most responsible” is malleable, the ECCC’s negotiation history and the intent of the drafters of the Court’s founding documents provided guidance to both the national and international judges. Whether the suspects in Cases 003 and 004 fell within the narrow scope of the Court’s jurisdiction turned on the results of the judicial investigation. Understandably but misguidedly, the thrust of the arguments made by the International Co-Prosecutor (and others such as DeFalco) was that the suspects in Cases 003 and 004 must be tried because they are alleged to be “most responsible,” and even if they do not squarely fit within the Court’s narrow jurisdictional contours, the suspects, being the most available, should be tried lest they escape criminal responsibility.
DeFalco, then as now, advances the overarching thesis that the Cambodian Government, specifically the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), and even more specifically then-Prime Minister Hun Sen was calling the shots and, in no uncertain terms, interfered with the independence of the national judges, thus ensuring that Cases 003 and 004 would die on the vine. Latching on to this claimed interference, DeFalco advances a new claim, namely, the legacy of the ECCC, among other things, is one of “negative capacity-building”. Put simply, he claims that the national judges and prosecutors and court staff and lawyers at the ECCC picked up new tricks. Or, putting it more indelicately, these actors refined their preexisting predispositions towards perverting justice: perversely using legality (deliberately misusing and misinterpreting and manipulating the law and legal processes) to affect state/CPP-sponsored illegality (preordained determinative results, mainly for political or financial gain).
I will restrict my criticism to DeFalco’s views of the ECCC’s legacy having a deleterious effect on the rule of law in Cambodia, while passingly touching on DeFalco’s claim of the “weaponization” of legal processes (manipulating legality to justify illegality). But first, full disclosure.
I was the International Co-Lawyer for Meas Muth, the Charged Person in Case 003. Unlike DeFalco, however, I am familiar with the case file and am much more acquainted with the ECCC, its cast of characters, the dynamics, and the conflicts and politics in its founding and functioning. I have also been involved in capacity-building projects in Cambodia since 1994. Over the past three decades, I have closely followed events in Cambodia. While I claim no particular expertise, I think I have a reasonable grasp of the situation in Cambodia.
The use of legal processes to achieve unfair or undemocratic results is prevalent in various forms even in “liberal” democracies where rule of law deficits are purportedly nonexistent – at least according to the preachy, smug Westerners who think their system of governance and legal traditions are irreproachable models that must be emulated by the lesser-enlightened of the Global South.
One need only look at the US to see how dysfunctional its democratic process has become. Elections are falsely claimed to be rigged as a pretext to overturn the will of the people. The august premises of the House of Representatives and Senators (the Capitol) were stormed and trashed by an angry armed mob of President Trump supporters (and effectively at his behest) only to be likened a few days later by Trump enablers in the Senate to benign and well-intended tourists. The corrosive gridlock in passing any meaningful legislation because of party politics and partisanship is stupefying. And what of the voter-suppression legislation and methods imposed in red (Republican) and purple (swing) states that determine elections (battleground states), which for all intent and purposes are designed to stifle, frustrate, and even disenfranchise voters of color and minorities who tend to vote democratic?
I can give other examples elsewhere, but I think the point is made. A certain amount of weaponization of legal processes takes place even in the supposed most advanced and sophisticated states, where mind you, democratic traditions have historically run high, where the socioeconomic conditions have been stable and promising, and where the rule of law has enjoyed an inviting environment.
No apologist for the Cambodian Government or the CPP, I am not justifying or condoning instances where the rule of law is ignored, where the law is twisted and turned and contorted, where verbal gymnastics are employed, much like a slight of hand, to make the objectively obvious illegitimate sound persuasively legitimate, even righteous. But over the years and with much reflection, I have come to understand that nothing is black and white, and what may seem simple generally turns out to be perplexingly complex.
Cambodia has a rule of law deficit. It has a significant way to go before it can meet Western standards of what is considered a liberal democracy. But who is to say that the Western way is the most appropriate way, especially for Eastern/Asian countries, which, incontestably, have their own values and philosophy and social structure and norms. Not everything in Cambodia may be moving in the right direction at a desired pace, but significant progress has been made. The average Cambodian is better off today than when I first arrived in 1994, when there was no Bar Association, no judicial educational facility, where virtually all judges and prosecutors were marginally trained and even more marginally competent, where no defense lawyers existed, and where fundamental human rights and fair trial rights were barely understood let alone appreciated.
Critics of the CPP would find DeFalco sympatico. Some of his general observations have been made by others. Some of them are obvious and well known. So what. Even Nil Nonn, the Presiding Judge of the ECCC Trial Chamber openly admitted that the Cambodian Judiciary was not independent.
But DeFalco’s claim that the ECCC’s legacy is one of “negative capacity building” – grounding his argument in his regurgitation of broken-record claims of political interference in Cases 003 and 004 – is recklessness masquerading as erudition. He offers zero proof in support of his claims that the transfer of knowledge and skills and experiences to the Cambodian judges, prosecutors, court staff, and others at the ECCC is being weaponized by them to eloquently and elegantly frame and foster illegality into legality.
Undoubtedly, the ECCC fell short of its intended goal of being a “model” court for Cambodia. I blame this more on the internationals than the nationals. Most of the internationals – many of whom lacked the requisite experience – came with a neo-colonialist attitude, thinking that the nationals, unsophisticated as they saw them, would obediently follow along subserviently. Not the place here to go into details (Craig Etcheson deals with this matters nicely in his book reviewed here), but suffice it to say, while international(ized) criminal tribunals and courts promise aspirational benefits such as reconciliation, peace, restorative justice, and with the added benefit of transitional justice modalities such fostering human rights and promoting the rule of law, their primary function is to adjudicate cases against accused charged with crimes that fall within the narrow scope of their jurisdiction.
That the ECCC has fostered among Cambodians, throughout, a greater awareness of the fundamental human rights recognized under the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the ICCPR, as guaranteed by the Cambodian Constitution, is beyond cavil. The outreach program during the ECCC’s operational year, as that under the current mechanism/legacy period (currently scheduled to expire in 2025), has been highly instructive and community-based. Judges, prosecutors, court staff, and lawyers have been trained. This transfer of knowledge is practical and essential. For the first time in modern Cambodia, as flawed as the ECCC trials may have been, Cambodians witnessed trial proceedings where both the accused and victims (civil parties) were robustly represented, where the proceedings were transparent, where witnesses gave evidence with dignity and protection, where judges were openly challenged by the parties by voicing objections and requesting reasoned decisions, etc. These benefits should not be overlooked, which is exactly what DeFalco does through his simplistic claims almost exclusively based on news clippings.
I’ll stop here.
Rather than go on to a lengthy exegesis showing why DeFalco offers nothing but speculation and innuendo by retreading the arguments of his previous article without any appreciable substance or proof in support of his catchy conceptualizations that some academics fondly rely on in displaying erudition, I invite you to make up your own mind. For that, I strongly suggest you read his initial polemic on Cases 003 and 004, my response, and then his supposed reassessment of the ECCC’s rule of law legacy, which, as already explained, I find recklessly accusatory of the national judges, prosecutors, court staff, and lawyers of the ECCC. Pay close attention to the cited authority and look beyond his artful rhetoric.